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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this conference is to discuss the impact of the legal
system on African-American males. When a conference focuses on this
question, such issues as the disproportionate numbers of African-American
males in the criminal or juvenile justice system are invariably raised.
Normally, other issues such as employment discrimination or the condition
of African-American males in public schools are also discussed. After a
healthy discussion of the deplorable statistics related to the condition of
black males, such conferences turn inevitably to the primary normative
question: "What should we do about this deplorable situation?" If this
question is directed toward governmental efforts aimed at improving the
situation, then the primary normative question becomes a secondary
normative question: "What should government do about this deplorable
situation?" In response to this secondary question, some have advocated
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establishing separate, publicly-funded African-American male academies,
classrooms, or special after-school classes.'
Proposals for African-American male public education programs are
one logical response to the secondary normative question. There are a
number of reasons why respondents to the question would focus on public
education. The most obvious reason is the one that brings us together
today. That is to respond to the so-called crisis affecting black males. This
is not, however, the only reason to argue for separate educational
programs. Another reason to support such public educational programs for
black males could be to more effectively inculcate feelings of loyalty and
connection between African-Americans. The objective of this group-
directed education is to convince these individuals that their situation is
intimately connected to that of all African-Americans. The desired result
of such education is that those individuals will want to participate in the
collective struggle of African-Americans against racial oppression and
domination in American society. Since this struggle is a collective effort
by the African-American community, individuals cannot succeed alone.
To be black is to be burdened with unchosen duties and obligations to assist
this community in its collective struggle. Individual blacks who harm
others in the African-American community are, therefore, engaged in
especially pernicious behavior.
Another reason would be to address the existence of the cultural
conflict between the dominant American culture enshrined in the traditional
public educational program and African-American students' culture.
Often, the traditional public educational program is seen as alien to the
cultural environment of black males. The existence of this cultural conflict
could be a significant factor in the substandard performance by African-
American males in public schools.2 Separate public educational programs
1. See, e.g., Patricia A. Jones, Educating Black Males-Several Solutions, but No
Solution, CRIsIs, Oct. 1991, at 12. Detroit, Chicago, San Diego, Baltimore and the
District of Columbia all have school boards that have considered such an idea. Pamela J.
Smith, Comment, All Male Black Schools and the Equal Protection Clause: A Step
Forward Toward Education, 66 TUL. L. REV. 2003, 2006 (1992); see also Kevin Brown,
Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: The Paradoxes Created by Legal
Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78 IOWA L. REV. 813, 849-52 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Grimes v. Sobol, 832 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), in which the
plaintiffs brought an action alleging that New York used a culturally biased curriculum in
its public schools which was systematically biased against African-Americans and
therefore violated Section 1983 and the regulations implementing Title VI. For further
discussion of Grimes v. Sobol, see infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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could provide the means by which to attenuate this conflict, thus improving
the educational performance of black males.
Another reason is underscored by the belief that education should
provide individuals with the mental tools to overcome successfully the
obstacles life will place in their path. In our dominant culture, African-
American males are involuntary inhabitants of a socially constructed racial
and gender category that has been imbued with particularly negative
connotations. African-American males are often thought to be poor, lazy,
lustful, ignorant, and especially prone to aggressive and criminal behavior.
Since race and gender are not only immutable characteristics, but are also
present when the individual is present, these dominant cultural
understandings are always threatening to assert themselves in many social
situations encountered by African-American males. Being members of a
social category with such negative connotations places African-American
males at a consistent disadvantage. Regardless of their intent at the time,
they often find themselves in situations where their appearance, actions,
and behaviors are interpreted by others to be consistent with our dominant
culture's common understandings about them. Separate public educational
programs, designed with this understanding in mind, could equip them to
address more effectively the ever present difficulties of being a black male
in American society.
Proposals for separate public educational programs for black males
could be viewed as race and gender motivated decision-making by
government officials. Therefore, the justifications for and the structure of
these programs must be sensitive to a Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection challenge. Thus, answers to the secondary normative question
must take into account the following primary legal question: "What legal
arguments can be made to legitimize these efforts of public school
officials?" Though I have placed both of the normative questions before
the primary legal question, there is a dialectical relationship between them.
In American society, law is the most powerful mechanism through which
normative decisions are implemented and our dominant normative structure
is maintained. Society's dominant conceptions of the social world outside
the legal arena will influence legal conceptions of the social world, and
legal conceptions of the social world influence extra-legal discussions.
Discussions regarding programs that will respond to the condition of
African-American males, therefore, are often already influenced by legal
conceptions, even if the participants in the discussion are not aware of or
do not formally acknowledge this influence.
This article is envisioned as both a conceptual archaeological
excavation of how contemporary legal discourse analyzes issues directed at
[23:63
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answering the secondary normative question and a brief genealogy of the
development of that discourse. By writing this article, I hope to reveal
another and more subtle impact of the legal system on the status and
condition of African-American males. I will show how the embedded
structures of legal discourse will affect the justifications for, and the
development of, public educational programs that can provide assistance to
black males. It is unlikely that public schools will be able to set up
programs limited to only black males. Such programs will have to be part
of a broader array of programs.
Part I explicates what I mean by structures of legal discourse and
introduces the two legal frameworks employed in analyzing issues of race
or gender and public education, the individualist and the traditional. In
Part II, I explain the embedded understandings and the historical
development of the individualist framework. The basic conceptual idea of
this framework views society as a collection of knowing individuals. This
framework can be applied to the legal analysis of either racial or gender
issues. In Part III, I discuss the embedded understandings and the
historical developments of the traditional framework. The fundamental
conceptual idea of this framework views society as a collection of knowing
individuals and substandard groups. African-Americans are considered to
be such a group. With regard to African-American males, we have an
anomalous situation. The Supreme Court has never developed an
understanding of males as less than females. The traditional framework is,
therefore, inapplicable to an analysis of public educational programs legally
conceptualized as benefiting only males. Hence, the traditional framework
applies only because the benefited males are also black. In Part IV, I
contrast the arguments for programs that can also assist black males in the
individualist framework and the traditional framework. I conclude the
article by explicating the dilemma that proponents of programs to assist
black males face within each of these two frameworks.
I. LEGAL DISCOURSE AND THE INTERSECTION OF RACE,
GENDER AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
As humans, we possess a reflective awareness which uses words and
language to identify, compare, analyze, and relate events so that they come
to us with a certain understanding and meaning and not as brute facts.'
The phenomena that force themselves into our .consciousness must be
interpreted in order to make sense out of them. These interpretations,
3. See, e.g., H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF: AN ESSAY IN CHRISTIAN
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 61 (1963).
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however, are not of separate and distinct items. Rather, each piece is a
part of a web that is present in its whole, even if we only focus upon one
part of the web at any given time.4 Hence, what we notice and how we
come to understand what we notice is both shaped and constrained by these
larger patterns of interpretation.5 These larger patterns of understanding
allow us to place a given event into a "proper" understanding. 6
The process of resolving legal disputes is also a process in which
phenomena is interpreted and a meaning is placed on those interpretations.
Our legal system consists of rules structured around various conceptions of
the social world.7 These conceptions are validated because the legal system
dictates the kinds of arguments that are persuasive for resolving legal
disputes. When one engages in legal discourse, one is engaged in a
process of conceptualizing and articulating phenomena in a way that
respects the larger patterns of understanding which our legal system
employs.
For any given dispute, legal conceptions and legal arguments are not
developed on a clean slate. They are developed against the backdrop of
prior legal history. This prior history is impressed into any given dispute
in the form of stare decisis which is always prevalent in shaping and
structuring legal arguments and conceptualizations. Prior cases, especially
those decided by the United States Supreme Court, provide the basis for
current legal analysis. It is through stare decisis that the legal past exerts
its tremendous influence on the present. In order to appreciate the
predicament which confronts the secondary normative question, it is
necessary to examine how the Supreme Court has historically constructed
and dealt with issues of gender, race, education, and the Equal Protection
Clause. This will allow us to not view legal disputes concerning
governmental programs that assist African-American males in isolation, but
instead to see them as part of a larger pattern of implicit understanding that
is always shaping and structuring how we comprehend this current issue.
Equal protection analysis generally analyzes the intersection of race
and gender as separate and distinct issues.8 Such issues are generally
4. See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE, PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 234 (1985).
5. Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
63, 68-69 (1993).
6. See, e.g., NIEBUHR, supra note 3, at 62.
7. See generally Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court:
Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968).
8. For an attempt to treat issues of discrimination against African-American
women distinct from analysis of gender or race, see Richard Cummings, All-Male Black
(continued)
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viewed as either racial issues or gender issues but not as a hybrid that calls
for a completely new analysis. 9 In Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan, " the Supreme Court used a middle level scrutiny test to determine
if a male was being discriminated against by a female-only nursing
program publicly funded by the state of Mississippi." This can be
contrasted with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 2 where a majority of
the Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications
by governmental entities regardless of the presumed beneficiaries.13
Schools: Equal Protection, the New Separatism and Brown v. Board of Education, 20
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725, 738-40 (1993).
9. See, e.g., Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(addressing separate schools for black males as an issue about gender and ignoring the
racial implications). For further discussion, see infra notes 199-205 and accompanying
text. A number of cases have addressed this issue in the context of Title VII lawsuits.
See DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977) (refusing to
recognize rights of women of color as separate from a gender or racial analysis);
Robinson v. Adams, 830 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1987) (refusing to recognize a Title VII claim
of discrimination based on race and sex by a black male); Jefferies v. Harris County
Community Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980) and Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833
F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987) (recognizing black females as a distinctly protected subgroup
under Title VII).
10. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
11. Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender, or on the assumption that an
individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than the fact that the
person happens to be a woman or happens to be a man. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
12. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
13. In Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), the Supreme Court addressed a
congressional redistricting map drawn by the State of North Carolina. North Carolina's
map had been drawn in such an order as to create two predominantly black congressional
districts. As a result, North Carolina elected two black Congresspersons; the first
African-Americans elected to Congress from North Carolina since Reconstruction.
According to the majority, the only way to explain the rather odd shaped boundary lines
was that their drawing was motivated solely by racial considerations. Id. at 2828.
Since African-Americans constituted 20% of the population of North Carolina, two
black Congresspersons out of 12 could not be considered racially disproportionate. As a
result, the substantive effect of the redistricting plan did not grant African-Americans a
disproportionate amount of representatives. The Court nevertheless struck down the
redistricting map, because the map could not be rationally understood as anything other
than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race and the
separation lacked sufficient justification. Id. What is particularly disturbing about Shaw
v. Reno, is that it suggests that strict scrutiny will apply even in situations where there can
be no one who is presumed to be harmed by such racially motivated decision-making. It
appears as if the Court is saying that the racially motivated decision-making, regardless of
any substantive harm to any person, is the violation.
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Irrespective of the particular legal test applied to race or gender, either
middle level or strict scrutiny, the test applied will obscure the underlying,
inconsistent cognitive frameworks developed by the Supreme Court for
analyzing equal protection issues addressing race and public education.
Constitutional analysis regarding issues of race and education has
developed into a dual discourse. Specifically, the equal protection analysis
used by the Supreme Court in the area of race and education has drawn
upon two different systems of ideas. These cognitive frameworks, the
individualist framework and the traditional framework, are the result of
constitutional and historical developments. Each uses different embedded
understandings to image racial phenomena. They have different views of
African-Americans and their role and place in American society. Each
framework has its own separate and distinct implications and limits for
structuring and providing legal arguments for public educational programs
that can also assist black males. These implications and limits are
conceptual because they reside in the basic assumptions upon which the
frameworks rest. As a consequence, these frameworks both structure and
limit the legal disputes regarding these public educational programs by
making only specific kinds of arguments persuasive. 4
Since the issue that we are focusing upon is public educational
programs that can also assist African-American males, we have an
intersection of the categories of race and gender. The legal analysis of the
individualist framework can be applied to discrimination based on race or
gender. The Supreme Court, however, has never developed an
understanding of males as less than females. The traditional framework,
therefore, is inapplicable when analyzing public educational programs
legally conceptualized as benefiting only males. The traditional framework
is applicable only because the males being focused upon are also black.
My discussion of the traditional framework, therefore, will be limited to
race. This also means that when addressing these programs for black
males, the traditional framework developed in the context of race will be
masquerading as a gender-based analysis. Accordingly, the traditional
justifications given for black male programs will also have implications for
black females.
14. They do not provide for radical shifts in the understanding of racial issues, but
rather work to constrain the understanding of racial phenomena. It is, of course, true that
radical shifts can and do occur in constitutional analysis of racial phenomena, but in most
given instances sufficient information cannot come into play that will create a paradigm
shift.
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I should also note that the analysis of educational programs that could
benefit African-American males will not be as precise as I suggest. This is
because both of these frameworks, the individualist and traditional, will be
present whenever legal arguments regarding public educational programs
that can assist black males are being made. Hence, the two alternative
visions will parade under the banner of one incoherent analysis applying
the heightened scrutiny required by the Equal Protection Clause for race or
gender discrimination, rather than the two separate and distinct alternative
interpretations presented in this article.
II. THE INDIVIDUALIST FRAMEWORK
One of the conceptual frameworks that the Supreme Court has used to
analyze issues involving race or gender and public education is the
individualist framework. The underlying premise of this framework is the
concept of society as a collection of knowing individuals. This framework
did not spring into existence over night. It was developed by the Supreme
Court over a number of years, primarily through its opinions in the area of
race and public education.
A. Conceptual Structure
1. View of the knowing individual
The individualist framework is the primary framework the Supreme
Court currently employs when applying the Equal Protection Clause to
resolve gender and racial issues in public education. The vision of society
implicit in many of the Supreme Court's more recent Equal Protection
Clause cases starts with the basic premise that the social world is a
collection of knowing individuals.' 5 The historical development of the
concept of the knowing individual in Anglo-American societies that appears
to be incorporated into our understanding of the Equal Protection Clause
was the result of hundreds of years of intellectual development. The
concept of the "knowing individual" is based around the idea of individual
self-determination. Contemporary American society, perhaps more so than
any other society in human history, believes that the primary goal of life is
for the individual to live in harmony with its essential self. Thus, any
given individual should seek to uncover the essential self, decipher its
15. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267 (1986); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 604 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Shaw v.
Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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truth, separate it from that which might obscure or alienate it, and then
structure the remaining aspects of one's life so that they are in harmony
with it. This essential self is unique for any given individual. Our
conception of the essential self is that it is a created, hidden, piece of
individual uniqueness. The presupposition of much of mainstream
American culture and hence, the journey of a lifetime that occupies us on
an emotional, psychological and psychoanalytic level, is the search
embodied in the attempt to comprehend and then to live in harmony with
the unique and hidden part of who we truly are.
The concept of the essential self requires that we see knowing
individuals as self-directed, coherent, free willed, integrated, and rational. 16
Because of the essential self, individuals are seen as capable of being free
from acculturation, tradition, obligation, or commitment. 7 At least in
principle, knowing individuals can be viewed as independent of their aims
and attachments. Thus, they have the ability to stand back and assess and
revise those aims and attachments." Since knowing individuals are
presumed to have this capacity, their attitudes, opinions, and beliefs are not
seen as products of the various cultural systems of meaning resulting from
socialization. On the contrary, these knowing individuals choose their
beliefs freely and are seen as the author of their own thoughts, the captains
of their respective ships, the ruler of their respective empires, and the
stewards of their behavior. The effect of their behavior is viewed as
controlled by their own intent.
2. Emancipatory role of this framework
One of the primary historical motivations for the development of the
concept of the knowing individual was the desire to emancipate the
individual from religious and feudal obligations and loyalties that were the
result of ascription and historical tradition. 9 In order for the individual to
16. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167,
181 (1990); Seyla Benhabib, Critical Theory and Postmodernism: On the Interplay of
Ethics, Aesthetics, and Utopia in Critical Theory, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1435 (1990).
17. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 152 (1985); see also MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1-8 (1982).
18. Michael J. Sandel, Religious Liberty-Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of
Choice, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 597, 598.
19. This concept of the social world is one of the fundamental presuppositions of the
predominant world view in contemporary Western society. BARBARA SENKOWSKI
STENGEL, JUST EDUCATION: THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION IN CONTEXT AND CONVERSATION
101 (1991). 1
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be self-determining, it was necessary to detach the individual from the
dead-hand grip of the past represented by Europe's religious and feudal
traditions.
This emancipatory concept took on particular importance in a society
like the United States which is a land composed predominately of
immigrants. Immigration to the United States was the largest single
migration in human history. Between 1821 and 1924, total immigration
exceeded thirty-three million people who came primarily from Europe."
As a result, America was founded as a country of immigrants who came
with different ethnic languages, cultures and heritages. The emancipatory
conception of the knowing individual in America, therefore, served also as
a means to reduce the sense of ethnic group identity for European
immigrants. By reducing the sense of ethnic identity, the possibility of the
destructive ethnic conflict so often seen in Europe was largely avoided in
America.
In 1954, the collective history of racial relations in North America had
spanned over 330 years. Except for a period of Reconstruction after the
Civil War, African-Americans had gone through primarily two major
social epics-slavery and legally enforced and sanctioned segregation.
America's history of race relations was the almost uninterrupted use of race
as a means to classify, constrain, and bind people of African descent.
Therefore, African-Americans were both imprisoned and joined together
by our society's dominant and historically developed cultural traditions
related to race. The Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education" was also motivated by a desire to emancipate African-
Americans from historical traditions that had constrained and bound them
in this society.
The conception of knowing individuals has definite implications for
resolving issues that involve race and gender. Since the goal of life is to
live in harmony with the essential self, this framework respects the ability
of the individual to be self-determining. It abhors attempts to constrain
individuals by classifying them based upon characteristics they do not
choose. Immutable characteristics of individuals are not matters of choice,
and thus are counter to the ability of an individual to be self-determining.
No concept could be more detrimental to the self-determination of knowing
individuals. The emancipatory function of this framework seeks to free the
individual from both the positive and negative connotations associated with
20. ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA 124 (1990). Thirty-three million
Europeans immigrated to the United States between 1821 and 1924. Id. at 23.
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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being ascribed to a particular racial and/or gender group. The individual is
to be freed from both the subordinating aspects of possessing an unchosen
trait and the unchosen obligations that are a product of being ascribed to a
community of people.
The proper resolution of racial and gender matters is to transcend their
consideration in order to free the individual from the historically developed
traditions that prevent them from being self-determining. Being freed from
historically developed traditions, however, does not prevent individuals
from choosing to associate themselves with their racial and/or gender
group. Such a choice has to be allowed in order for individuals to be self-
determining. It is only when the association is compelled that it violates the
knowing individual's ability to be self-determining.
3. Role of government
The individualist framework also has a limited conception of the role of
government. The roots of American liberalism can be traced to 17th
century England.2 There, primarily with the writings of John Locke, a
philosophical defense of individual rights was developed that was not
rooted in classical or biblical sources. The essence of Locke's philosophy
is to prioritize the rights of the individual before the rights of society.
Society "comes into existence only through the voluntary contract of
individuals trying to maximize their own self-interest. 2 3  As a result,
society and government are there to protect the rights of individuals.
Since government comes into existence to protect the rights of these
knowing individuals, its role is dictated by that function. The individualist
framework, therefore, requires that government be neutral on the question
of the good life and respect equally every knowing individual's pursuit of
their own various objectives. Government must both respect the
individuality of its citizens and mediate their conduct. This requires that
government engage in a balancing act where it allows individuals to pursue
their own desires, yet constrains individual choice so that they do not
unjustly interfere with the rights of others to do the same. By doing this,
government allows individuals to choose their own goals and ends, while
allowing simultaneously a similar liberty for others.24
This conceptual structure has implications for how government ought
to structure its public educational programs. Children do not fit the
22. For a discussion of American individualism, see generally BELLAH ET AL., supra
note 17.
23. Id. at 143.
24. See, e.g., Sandel, supra note 18, at 598.
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individualist framework's ontological premise of knowing individuals.
While adults are seen as choosers, children are seen as learners. The role
of public education is to convert learners into choosers-knowing
individuals. Since public education is still a government function,
however, this process must be conducted within the constraints of
neutrality imposed on government." Public education, therefore, must
treat people as individuals and not advance the parochial interest of a given
group.26
B. The Constitutional Historical Development
The individualist framework developed piecemeal over a very long
period of time as part of a historical process7 Since the Supreme Court's
25. The requirement of governmental neutrality suggests an implicit model of public
education. This implicit model views the function of public education as converting
learners into knowing individuals. Public education must therefore perform two
conflicting functions. Education must perform a uniquely individualistic function geared
towards promoting the capacity of individuals to decide for themselves what their plans or
purposes should be and how to pursue them. This academic function is value neutral,
because it is directed towards increasing the capacity of children to choose. Education
must also perform a limiting function for society. This limiting function inculcates values
that restrict the desirability of certain choices individuals might make. This societal
function is also value neutral, but in a different way. The value neutrality here is
predicated upon instilling values into children-such as self-sufficiency, self-reliance,
belief in equality, tolerance for political and religious diversity and respect for formal
authority-that will allow others to pursue their desires without undue interference. For a
more in-depth discussion of this, see Brown, supra note 1, at 858-67.
26. But see Ronald Dworkin, Are Quotas Unfair?, in RACIAL PREFERENCE AND
RACIAL JUSTICE: THE NEW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CONTROVERSY 175-89 (Russell Nieli ed.,
1991). Dworkin gives a definition of liberalism in which it is an ultimate goal, but not the
conception of society that should be recognized now. As a consequence, taking account of
race should be allowed if it serves to reduce the amount of racial consciousness that
currently exists in our society. In the long run, affirmative action programs in higher
education serve to do this by increasing the number of blacks who are at work in the
professions. It will reduce race consciousness, because it will reduce the sense of
frustration, injustice and racial self-consciousness in the black community to the point that
blacks can think of themselves as individuals. In addition, professional association of
blacks with whites will decrease the degree to which whites think of blacks as a race
rather than as people.
27. "Individualism was .. . embedded in the civic and religious structures of
colonial life .... " BELLAH ET AL., supra note 17, at 147. The term, however, was not
given a name until Tocqueville used "individualism" to describe the restless American
quest for material betterment. Id. Application of the liberal tradition to blacks in
American society can be traced to its antecedent found in religious leaders who formally
advocated an individualistic conception of society under God over 100 years before the
American Revolutionary War. For example, Cotton Mather-the symbol of authoritarian
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1971 opinion in Reed v. Reed,28 a heightened scrutiny analysis has been
applied to gender discrimination. When we consider, however, that the
Fourteenth Amendment was passed after the Civil War, it is not surprising
that the primary application and development of the Equal Protection
Clause has been to racial discrimination. As a result, race has historically
served as the paradigm for Equal Protection Clause analysis. 29 Most of the
following discussion, therefore, will focus upon the Supreme Court's
public education cases developing the individualist framework in the
context of race. In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,3" however,
the Supreme Court made it clear that the individualist framework also
applies to the analysis of gender discrimination in public education.
Since the original Constitution protected slavery, the recognition that
African-Americans could be viewed, at least in part, as knowing
individuals did not occur until the end of the Civil War and the passage of
the reconstruction amendments-the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.31 Much of the potential of those Amendments to define the
concept of knowing individual to include blacks, however, was checked by
narrow judicial interpretations in the last decades of the 19th century.32
The modem idea of expanding the individualist framework to
encompass blacks within the definition of knowing individuals can be
traced back to the famous dissent by Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson."
As Justice Harlan argued:
[I]n view of the Constitution, ... there is no caste here.
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens . . . . The law regards
man as man . . . and takes no account . . . of his color
Puritanism-asserted the equality of slaves in the sight of God. KENNETH L. KARST,
BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 45 (1989). Richard
Baxter, another English Puritan, told slaveholders in 1673 that slaves are as good a kind
as you and even though their sins have enslaved them to you, remember that they have
immortal souls and are just as capable of salvation as you are. Id.
28. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
29. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
30. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
31. Shortly after the American Revolution, Massachusetts adopted the notion of
equality before the law and wrote it into its state constitution. ANDREW KULL, THE
COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 2 (1992).
32. For a discussion of some of these cases, see infra notes 168-78 and
accompanying text.
33. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). While Justice Harlan's
opinion was certainly more in favor of the notion of equality than the majority, it was not
a declaration of equality either.
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when the civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of
the land are involved.'
Justice Harlan's opinion echoed the fundamental conceptual premise of
the individualist framework that individuals should be allowed to pursue
their own independently determined desires. For him, one of the main
problems with the Louisiana segregation statute was that it interfered with
the personal freedom of citizens. The statute eliminated the ability of a
white man and a black man to choose to occupy the same public
conveyance on a public highway.35 By preventing such, the government
was infringing upon the personal liberty of a person to make such a
choice.36
1. Brown v. Board of Education
Between 1938 and 1950, the Supreme Court addressed four cases
dealing with segregation in graduate and professional schools.37 The
seminal case in the expansion of the concept of knowing individuals to
include African-Americans, however, was Brown v. Board of Education.3
Because of the complexity of a case like Brown I and the American society
that existed in 1954 for which it was written, classifying it is generally
dependent upon the aspects of Brown I that are highlighted for discussion.
Brown I can be conceptualized within both the individualist framework and
the traditional framework.39 In this section, I will articulate the
meaning of Brown I within the individualist framework and postpone the
conceptualization of it within the traditional framework until later.'
34. Id. at 559.
35. Id. at 556.
36. Portions of Justice Harlan's opinion make it very clear that he did not view
African-Americans as the equal of whites. Id. at 552-64. Even though Justice Harlan's
opinion was not a model liberal opinion overall, he was willing to go further than his
fellow brethren at the time and arguably abolish the distinction between political and civil
rights and social rights.
37. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Board of
Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
38. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For purposes of this article,
this case will be referred to as Brown I.
39. These two options do not exhaust the possible conceptions of Brown 1. As a
number of scholars have pointed out in the past, Brown I could also be seen as an anti-
subordination case. For a recent example of this in public education, see Wendy Brown-
Scott, Race Consciousness in Higher Education: Does "Sound Educational Policy" Support the
Continued Existence of Historically Black Colleges?, 43 EMORY L.J. 1 (1994).
40. See infra part III.
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In Brown 1, the Supreme Court struck down state and local statutes that
segregated students in public elementary and secondary schools, even
though the schools' physical facilities and other tangible factors were
equal."' The harm of de jure segregation within the individualist
framework can be seen as one of three different violations of governmental
neutrality. First, public schools were not treating students, teachers, and
administrators as individuals but rather as members of a group. Hence, the
individuals, especially if they were black, were being confined and
segregated not based upon matters of choice but upon accidents of birth.
In effect, the government was imprisoning individuals within racial
traditions and not providing protection to allow them to be self-
determining. Second, despite the Supreme Court's assertion of equality
regarding physical facilities and other tangible factors, white students were
provided with better equipped and funded schools than their black
counterparts. As a result, the track record of segregated public schools
was that the state would advance the parochial interest of only whites when
left to its own devises. Finally, segregation was stigmatizing to African-
Americans because the government was conveying the message that
African-Americans were not the equals of whites through segregation and
underfunded black schools. The dissemination of this stigmatic message
was also a violation of the constraints of neutrality.
Within the individualist framework, the remedy for these harms is for
government to stop violating the constraints of neutrality. 2 Under the
individualist tradition, there is a critical distinction to be made between
individuals voluntarily choosing to separate themselves along racial and
ethnic lines from situations where government forces them to do so."3 As
long as public schools use race neutral methods, such as freedom of choice
plans or neighborhood attendance policies, to determine school attendance
and school personnel at equally funded and staffed schools, then public
schools are respecting the requirement of governmental neutrality.
Consequently, within the individualist tradition, striking down segregation
41. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 492.
42. In another article, I have supplied an argument that would have justified school
desegregation as a remedy for dejure segregation within the liberal tradition. See Kevin
Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination of Unitary Status
Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1105,
1112-40 (1990). However, this was not the rationale for school desegregation articulated
by the Supreme Court.
43. Pamela J. Smith, All-Male Black Schools and the Equal Protection Clause: A
Step Forward Toward Education, 66 TUL. L. REv. 2003, 2009 (1992).
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statutes is completely different from ordering public school officials to take
account of race in order to ensure integrated student bodies."
Many southern federal judges and school officials implementing the
Court's opinions in Brown I and Brown 1 5 interpreted the Court's opinions
as being within the individualist framework. Those courts and school
officials relied upon wording in Briggs v. Elliote6 to fill the vacuum left by
the Supreme Court. In addressing on remand one of the companion cases
of Brown I, the three-judge federal district court panel in South Carolina
wrote the following:
[The Supreme Court] has not decided that the states must
mix persons of different races in the schools or must
require them to attend schools or must deprive them of the
right of choosing the schools they attend. What it has
decided, and all that it has decided, is that a state may not
deny to any person on account of race the right to attend
any school that it maintains. . . The Constitution, in
other words, does not require integration. It merely
forbids discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation
as occurs as the result of voluntary action. It merely
forbids the use of governmental power to enforce
47segregation.
When I focus on the traditional framework, I will examine Green v.
New Kent County.48 In Green, the Court definitively moves from a
possible non-discrimination interpretation of Brown I to a forced integration
interpretation.
44. One of the provisions included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited the
distribution of federal financial assistance to programs or activities engaged in
discrimination. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare issued regulations
addressing racial discrimination in federally aided school systems as directed by 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988). In addition, the Department's Office of Education established
standards for eligibility for federal funds of school systems in the process of
desegregation. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-80.13, 181.1-181.76 (1967). "Freedom of choice"
plans were seen as acceptable under these regulations. See Green v. County Sch. Bd.,
391 U.S. 430, 433-34 & n.2 (1968); see also LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE:
THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS 53 (1976).
45. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). For the purposes of this
article, this case will be referred to as Brown II.
46. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
47. Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
48. 391 U.S. 430 (1968); see infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
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2. Keyes v. School District No. 1-The acceptance of governmental
intent as the equal protection violation
Another major case in the development of the individualist framework
for analysis of issues of race and public education was Keyes v. School
District No. 1.49 Until 1973, the Court had only addressed segregation of
public elementary and secondary schools in states where the schools were
segregated pursuant to state statutory authority as of 1954. In Keyes, the
Court for the first time addressed a school system where the segregation
was not traceable to such a state statute. Hence, the Court had to address
the issue of when, in the absence of such a state statute, segregation
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The district court in Keyes used de facto segregation to find the
constitutional violation; the Supreme Court, however, rejected this
method."0 The Court noted that what is" or is not an unconstitutionally
segregated school will necessarily depend upon the facts of each particular
case.5 De jure segregation, and not de facto segregation, violated the
Constitution." The distinction between de jure and de facto segregation is
49. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
50. The district court found that de jure segregation existed with respect to the
segregation of schools in the Park Hill area of Denver. The district court also held that
the finding of intentional segregation in Park Hill was not in any sense material to the
question of segregative intent in other areas of the city. The district court, therefore,
concluded that the petitioner's evidence of intentional discriminatory school board action
in areas of the school district other than Park Hill was insufficient to "dictate the
conclusion that this is de jure segregation which calls for an all-out effort to desegregate.
It is more like defacto segregation, with respect to which the rule is that the court cannot
order desegregation in order to provide a better balance." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1
313 F. Supp. 61, 73 (D.C. Colo. 1970). Nevertheless, the district court went on to hold
that the proofs established that segregated core city schools were educationally inferior to
the predominantly white schools in other parts of the district-that is, "separate facilities...
unequal in the quality of education provided." Id. at 83. The district court went on to
conclude that under the doctrine of separate but equal established in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), the respondent school board constitutionally "must at a minimum . . .
offer an equal educational opportunity." Id. The court noted that the only feasible and
constitutionally acceptable program to furnish such an equal educational opportunity was a
system of desegregation and integration which provides compensatory education in an
integrated environment. Id. at 90, 96.
51. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 196.
52. For a description of the racial climate leading up to the litigation in Denver, see
J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 195-98 (1979); see also James J. Fishman & Lawrence Strauss,
Endless Journey: Integration and the Provision of Equal Educational Opportunity in
Denver's Public Schools: A Study of Keyes v. School District No. 1, in JUSTICE AND
(continued)
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that de jure segregation is a "current condition of segregation resulting
from intentional state action directed specifically to [segregate schools]. "
According to the Court, only segregation that is the result of intentional
54governmental conduct violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I need to elaborate upon two important points. First, the individualist
framework dictates that racial separation that is the result of voluntary
choice of individuals must be distinguished from segregation that is
produced by governmental conduct. If individuals voluntarily choose to
separate themselves, even along racial lines, they are following their own
desires and are, therefore, being self determining. If segregation,
however, is the result of governmental influence, then it is in violation of
governmental neutrality. This kind of segregation is not the product of the
yoluntary choice of individuals. If the Court had chosen to use de facto
segregation to determine when racial separation violated the Constitution, it
would not have been leaving room for individuals to choose to separate
themselves along racial lines. Such a position would have put Keyes
outside the boundaries of the individualist framework.55
SCHOOL SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN EDUCATION LITIGATION 185-89 (Barbara
Flicker ed., 1990). At least one commentator has argued that the actions of the Denver
School Board could not have constituted intentional segregation. See Mark G. Yudof,
Nondiscrimination and Beyond: The Search for Principle in Supreme Court Desegregation
Decisions, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 97 (Walter G.
Stephan & Joe R. Feagin eds., 1980). But see Fishman & Strauss, supra, at 189-200, for
a discussion of how the Denver School Board resisted efforts to desegregate the school
after the determination of liability for segregation. See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
609 F. Supp. 1491, 1519-20 (D. Colo. 1985) (chastising the school board for its
uncooperative behavior during the desegregation process), aff'd, 895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 951 (1991).
53. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 205-06.
54. Woodward and Armstrong present the Justices private deliberations about Keyes
as regarding the limitations of desegregation remedies. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 260-68 (1979). While the
Court in Keyes rejected de facto segregation as the basis of the constitutional harm, they
also adopted a procedural rule that made proving de jure segregation easier. Keyes, 413
U.S. at 208. If plaintiffs establish intentional segregation in a portion of the school
system, the Court will presume that unlawful segregation existed throughout the school
system. Id. This presumption alleviates plaintiffs' enormous burden of attempting to
prove unlawful segregation for each school in the system in order to establish a system-
wide remedy.
55. Since this article is addressing the secondary normative question, it is limited to
situations where public school officials believe that some public educational programs to
assist black males should be implemented. The issue of whether others by filing equal
protection lawsuits can force public school officials to act on behalf of African-American
males is outside the scope of this article. Nevertheless, Keyes and its subsequent
(continued)
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The second important point to elaborate upon is how the Court treats
the government in terms of determining when it violates the Constitution.
What the Court does in Keyes is to view the issue of government
discrimination in the way that it would do so for knowing individuals.
Government is presumed to be a knowing individual. Thus, its actions are
also presumed to be controlled by its intent. 6  Like individuals,
government is capable of acting for many different reasons. Government
acting with proper motives may adversely effect minorities. It is not
adverse impact, however, that triggers an equal protection violation.
Governmental actions only constitute discrimination within the Equal
Protection Clause when they are motivated by justifications that violate the
constraints of neutrality.
This point can be illustrated by examining the opinion of the federal
district court in the case of Grimes v. Sobol.57 In Grimes, the plaintiffs
brought an action alleging that the New York City public schools used a
culturally biased curriculum which violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The district court, -in an opinion authored by Judge Kimba Wood, seemed
willing to concede that the curriculum in New York City's public schools
was culturally biased and hence harmful to minorities including African-
Americans. Judge Wood noted, however, that in analyzing this issue for
the purpose of an equal protection violation, it is not the effect of the
curriculum that is determinative. Rather, the plaintiffs must allege that the
adoption of the curriculum was motivated because of and not in spite of its
ratification by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977),
make it clear that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause has been defined within the
individualist framework and, therefore, only occurs when government has engaged in
intentional discrimatory conduct. Courts can order that government take the necessary
steps to remedy the effects of discrimination in order to reestablish governmental
neutrality. The individualist framework, therefore, does provide a mechanism in which
corrective actions can be taken to remedy specific and identifiable violations of
governmental neutrality. This is going to be of limited assistance, however, to those who
wish to compel public school officials to institute programs solely for the benefit of
African-Americans males.
The first hurdle will be to establish that public schools are discriminating against
black males. It is not the negative effects of educational practices and policies on black
males which will constitute discrimination. Rather, those policies or practices challenged
must have been motivated by discriminatory purpose. Secondly, the remedy will normally not
be to provide separate programs for black males, but for the public schools to adopt
measures that correct the discriminatory practices and thus restore governmental
neutrality.
56. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 205-06.
57. 832 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 37 F.3d 857 (2d Cir. 1994).
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detrimental effect on African-American students. 8 Discriminatory purpose
cannot be inferred from the state's awareness of the detrimental effects or
consequences of its culturally biased curriculum content, or its conscious
refusal to adopt Afrocentric educational initiatives.
Since the individualist framework treats government as an individual, it
views its actions as motivated by its intent. Consistent with the
individualist framework, Judge Wood noted that despite the existence of
harm to African-American students, governmental action only violates the
Equal Protection Clause when it is motivated by discriminatory intent. The
curriculum employed in the New York City public schools was adopted
because of legitimate pedagogical considerations. Thus, its adoption was
not motivated by discriminatory intent. As a result, the negative impact of
such a curriculum on black students is an unfortunate consequence of
racially neutral governmental action.
It is also important to note that the, individualist framework used by
Judge Wood cannot adequately address the assertion that the curriculum
employed by the New York public schools is culturally biased. The
concept of cultural bias views attitudes, beliefs, and opinions of individuals
as products of socialization rather than individual realization. Hence, to
see the concept of cultural bias on its own terms requires us to focus on a
cultural system of meaning that individuals come to know through the
process of socialization. To view the individual's attitudes as products of
culture requires us to reject the ontological premise of the knowing
individual upon which the individualist framework is based.
Judge Wood quickly forces the concept of cultural bias into the
conceptual understandings of the individualist framework. The concept of
cultural bias is then reinterpreted. It must be understood as either an effect
of racially neutral governmental decision-making or the product of
intentional discrimination. If it is understood as an effect of the former,
then it is not discrimination. If it is understood as a product of the latter,
then it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, a conceptual
limit of the individualist framework is exposed. There is no way within
this framework to come to grips with the concept of cultural bias given the
premises upon which cultural bias is based. Such a concept has to be
reconceptualized and is, therefore, misunderstood within the limits of
understanding that are embedded in the individualist framework.59
58. Id. at 708.
59. It is true that some federal district courts in their school desegregation decrees
ordered public schools to take some measures in order to correct cultural bias. See, e.g.,
Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982, 1014-16 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 582 F.2d 750 (3d
(continued)
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3. Bakke-Individualism encompasses everyone
The Court's opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke' represents another important development of the, individualist
framework in the area of race and public education. 6' For years prior to
Bakke, the Supreme Court seemed to be on the side of the lowly, the
despised, and the dispossessed.62 It was thought that the Constitution might
be there to protect those who could not protect themselves. 63  As the
argument would go, the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was not to
protect the rights of individuals, but to protect discrete and insular
minorities from the ravages of the majoritarian political process. If the
Court was not addressing a governmental program that discriminated
against such minorities, then strict scrutiny was not required.' When Allan
Bakke presented his claim to the Supreme Court, however, the Court was
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980); Berry v. School Dist., 515 F. Supp. 344,
373-74 (W.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 698 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
892 (1983). The context of the finding of cultural bias, however, was in cases where the
courts had already found intentional discriminatory conduct by the school officials.
Consistent with the individualist framework, these courts ordered public schools to
eliminate such bias in order to reestablish governmental neutrality. Cultural bias in the
curriculum was considered a part of the effect of the intentional discriminatory conduct
that led to the original court involvement.
60. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
61. Certainly an argument can be made that public elementary and secondary
schools should not be treated the same as public colleges and universities. There are two
issues that distinguish public elementary and secondary schools from public colleges and
universities. First, governmental actions affecting public schools deal with the rights of
minors. The Supreme Court has already recognized that the rights of minors are not co-
extensive with that of adults. See Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634, 637 (1979).
Second, in a number of cases the Supreme Court has recognized that the primary purpose
of public education is to inculcate fundamental values necessary for the maintenance of
our democratic function. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986);
Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864
(1982); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 n.20 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68, 77, 99 (1979). The predominance of the value inculcating function of public
elementary and secondary education could provide another basis for distinguishing
governmental actions that affect public schools from those that affect public colleges and
universities. For an argument that the harm of de jure segregation within public schools
was sui generis, see Brown, supra note 42, at 1112-40.
62. WILKINSON, supra note 52, at 253.
63. This view animates RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976). See also
Richard B. Sobol, Against Bakke, in RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RACIAL JUSTICE: THE
NEW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CONTROVERSY 167-74 (Russell Nieli ed., 1991).
64. See Sobol, supra note 63, at 167-74.
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being asked to address an equal protection challenge by a blue-eyed, blond-
haired man of Norwegian ancestry.'
Allan Bakke's application to the University of California at Davis
medical school was rejected. He brought suit challenging the legality of
the school's special admissions program under which 16 of the 100
positions in the class were reserved for "economically or educationally
disadvantaged applicants. "' The medical school viewed individuals who
were African-American, Chicano, Asian, or Native American as the only
ones fitting the description of disadvantaged applicants. The special
admissions program consisted of a separate admissions system operating
apart from, but in coordination with, the regular adrrissions process.
Petitioners argued that the Court should reserve the application of strict
scrutiny to situations where the classifications serve to disadvantage
discrete and insular minorities.67 In Bakke, four of the justices were
prepared to uphold Davis's special admissions program as written. 68 Four
other justices were prepared to strike down the program as a violation of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.69 The controlling opinion was,
therefore, delivered by Justice Powell.
Before Powell addressed the special admissions program, he had to
resolve the preliminary issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment was to
protect discrete and insular minorities from the failures of the majoritarian
political process or to protect the rights of all individuals. In rejecting the
argument by U.C. Davis, Powell stated that the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons. As a result, the Equal
Protection Clause cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual
and something else when applied to a person of another color.7'
Powell noted that the perception of racial and ethnic distinctions is
rooted in the nation's constitutional history.7 Quoting from the Slaughter:
House Cases,' Powell candidly admitted that the pervading purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was the freedom of the slave race, the security and
firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly
65. WILKINSON, supra note 52, at 253.
66. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1978).
67. The petitioners were relying upon the statement by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
68. 438 U.S. at 325-26.
69. Id. at 412-13.
70. Id. at 289-90.
71. Id. at 291.
72. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 171 (1873).
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freedmen and citizens from the oppression of slavery.73 This one
pervading purpose, however, was replaced because the Equal Protection
Clause was virtually strangled in its infancy and relegated to decades of
relative obscurity by post-Civil War judicial reactionism.74 Between the
time that the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was strangled
and new life was breathed into it, the country had become a nation of
minorities, each having to struggle (to some extent still struggle) to
overcome the prejudices of a monolithic majority. Despite his recognition
of the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, Powell stated:
It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal
protection to all-persons permits the recognition of special
wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that
accorded others. . . . Once the artificial line of a "two-
class theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment is put aside,
the difficulties entailed in varying the level of judicial
review according to a perceived "preferred" status of a
particular racial or ethnic minority are intractable.75
Powell's opinion rejected the view that the Equal Protection Clause
was adopted only to protect discrete and insular minorities. With Bakke,
the Court began its movement away from a possibly pluralistic conception
of a Fourteenth Amendment that could recognize the existence of diverse
racial and ethnic groups.76 However, since Powell only spoke for himself,
the Court moved into a period of uncertainty regarding the underlying
principles embodied in the Equal Protection Clause. With the Court's
opinion in City of Richmond v. Croson,77 the individualistic framework
became the firmly entrenched vision of the Supreme Court when
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause. In Croson, a majority of the
Court officially adopted for the first time Justice Powell's argument that the
strict scrutiny test should be used for determining any equal protection
73. 438 U.S. at 291.
74. Some of these cases are discussed later infra notes 168-78 and accompanying
text.
75. 438 U.S. at 295.
76. The Court's opinion in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990),
suggests that congressional and federal authorities race-conscious measures receive more
deference than those adopted by state and local officials. However, this distinction may
only be important to Justice White since the majority opinion in Metro Broadcasting is
very similar to the dissenting opinion in Croson. Moreover, the dissent in Metro
Broadcasting is very similar to the majority opinion in Croson.
77. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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violation, regardless of whether the measure benefited or harmed certain
disadvantaged racial and ethnic minorities.78
4. Individualist framework applied to gender in public education
In the Court's most significant equal protection case addressing the
issue of gender segregation in public education, the individualist
framework was also used. In the case of Mississippi University for Women
v. Hogan,9 a male respondent, Joe Hogan, sought admission to the
Mississippi University for Women ° ("MUW") School of Nursing's
baccalaureate program. Although otherwise qualified, his application was
denied solely because of his gender. Hogan sought injunctive and
declaratory relief and claimed that the single sex admissions policy violated
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice O'Connor's five-person majority opinion for the Court noted:
To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification
must be substantially related to an important governmental
objective .... [T]he test for determining the validity of a
gender-based classification is straightforward, it must be
applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females. Care must be taken in
ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects
archaic and stereotypic notions. 8"
The argument used by the State of Mississippi to justify the single-sex
admissions policy of MUW's School of Nursing was that it compensated
for discrimination against women and therefore constituted educational
affirmative action. 82 In applying this test to Hogan's exclusion from the
School of Nursing, the Court concluded that the State fell short of
establishing the persuasive justification needed to sustain the gender-based
classification. O'Connor noted that MUW's policy of excluding males
78. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice
Kennedy, adopted strict scrutiny as the requisite test for the Equal Protection Clause,
regardless of the race of those benefitted or burdened. Id. at 493-94. Justice Scalia, in a
separate concurring opinion, also endorsed the concept of strict scrutiny regardless of the
governmental purpose. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.
Ct. 2816 (1993).
79. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
80. Mississippi University for Women was the oldest state supported all female
college in the United States.
81. 458 U.S. at 724-25.
82. Id. at 718.
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"tends to perpetuate the stereotyped notion of nursing as an exclusively
woman's job."83 She further concluded that since MUW allowed men to
audit the class, its educational claim that women are adversely affected by
the presence of men was undermined; therefore, the exclusion of men
cannot be related to any educational goals."
The Court's opinion in Hogan embodies the individualist framework's
fundamental conception of society as a collection of knowing individuals.
The petitioner was a man who was complaining of discrimination, yet it
was the stereotypes about women that were being supported by the female-
only nursing program. The Court, therefore, allowed a man's admission to
the nursing program partly because rejecting his application furthered
stereotypes about women. The admission of men to the nursing program
assists the emancipation of women from the traditional and stereotypical
roles developed for them by our society and thereby furthers the ability of
women to be self-determining.
When the individualist framework is applied to gender discrimination
in education, just as when it is applied to race discrimination, it will be
difficult to justify a policy of providing gender-segregated education solely
to benefit either men or women. To view a governmental program that
benefits only one of the genders rejects the conceptual premise of the
individualist framework. It would require that we view the social world as
being composed not of knowing individuals but of gendered persons.
C. Implications of the Individualist Framework for Establishing Public
Educational Programs to Benefit African-American Males
The individualistic framework will be one of the frameworks employed
to analyze the constitutionality of public educational programs designed to
assist African-American males. Given the conceptual structure of the
individualist framework, it becomes apparent rather quickly why none of
the reasons explained earlier for supporting public educational programs
for black males will be considered persuasive arguments within this
framework.85 To justify public educational programs by focusing on the
black male's crisis or by attempting to inculcate more effectively feelings
of loyalty to other African-Americans, requires us to conceptualize black
males as members of a racial and gender group and not as potential
knowing individuals. If government were motivated to institute public
educational programs based on these considerations, it would be violating
83. Id. at 729.
84. Id.
85. See supra pp. 65-66.
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the fundamental idea of individual self-determination.86 These notions
require that government recognize black males as members of a racial
group. Thus, their ability to be self-determining is violated by their
treatment based upon an unchosen characteristic.
As previously noted, other problems arise if the justification for
separate programs is the recognition of a cultural conflict, or the fact that
black males inhabit a social category in our dominant culture that is
constructed with particularly negative connotations.87 Justifying public
educational programs with these reasons creates problems similar to those
that existed for the plaintiffs in Grimes v. Sobol.88 The individualist
framework presumes that knowing individuals are capable of standing back
from their socialization in order to accurately assess and revise those
beliefs. Because of this capacity, attitudes, opinions, and beliefs are seen
as products of individual' realization. Therefore, to talk about the attitudes,
opinions, and beliefs of individuals as products of culture requires the
rejection of the conceptual premise that the knowing individual's beliefs are
the product of individual realization. Hence, discussions of culture and the
implication that beliefs are products of culture requires the rejection of the
concept of an essential self that holds beliefs in favor of the concept of a
socially constituted self that is a product of acculturation.89
86. Professor Ronald Dworkin has argued that the justification for taking account of
race in the context of affirmative action programs is to reduce the race consciousness of
our society. He notes that American society is currently a racially conscious society
which is the inevitable result of our history. Increasing the number of blacks who work in
the professions will in the long run reduce the sense of frustration that blacks feel to the
point that they may begin to think of themselves as individuals. By increasing the exposure of
blacks to whites will also decrease the degree to which whites think of blacks as a race
rather than as people. See Dworkin, supra note 26, at 175-177. Dworkin, at least on the
issue of our racial beliefs, is rejecting the concept of knowing individuals whose beliefs
are products of individual realization. Thus, he views current racial beliefs as products of
conditions established as a result of our society's discriminatory past. Professor
Dworkin's argument is one that views the individualist framework as the ultimate goal and
not the present reality. Since we are not currently such a society, it is necessary to
implement policies and programs that will reduce race consciousness and involuntary
racial associations. Thus, Dworkin's argument is one that would allow race conscious
decision-making during the time period where we move from a race conscious society to
one that is colorblind. See also Paul Gewirtz, Choice in Transition: School
Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728 (1986).
87. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
88. 832 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 37 F.3d 857 (2d Cir. 1994).
89. It is possible to argue that ameliorating cultural conflicts should be
conceptualized as educational decision-making. See supra note 55 (discussing concept of
legitimate educational justifications within the individualist framework).
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The individualist framework has no conceptual categories in which to
assimilate the aforementioned justifications that are consistent with its
underlying understandings of the social world. As a result, if those
arguments are made in an effort to justify such programs, they will be
misunderstood within the individualist framework as attempts to violate the
constraints of governmental neutrality. Such arguments will be
comprehended as government failing to respect the individuality of its
citizens or advancing the parochial interests of black males.
This does not mean that no public educational programs can be
provided for African-American males-only that such programs need to be
a part of a much larger approach that respects the constraints of
governmental neutrality. The larger approach, of which assistance for
black males can be a component, must respect everyone's individuality and
not appear to advance only the parochial interest of black males. The
larger approach must be one that seeks to provide options for diversity in
education for everyone in the public school system. The justifications for
such an approach should be based upon their educational suitability and not
upon any desire to respond to a "crisis among black males," counter
cultural problems' or heighten intragroup sensibilities. To illustrate the
structure of this argument in the area of race and education, I will examine
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and Justice Thomas's recent opinion in
United States v. Fordice.9" To depict the structure of this argument in the
context of gender and education, I will look at the recent cases addressing
Virginia Military Institute and The Citadel-two publicly funded all-male
colleges.
1. Application of the individualist framework in the area of race and
public education
The individualist framework is generally hostile to race-motivated
decision-making. There have, however, been two notable exceptions
where certain Justices of the Supreme Court have endorsed a limited role
for race-based decision-making as part of the exercise of legitimate
educational decision making. Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke addressed
the issue of educational justifications for considering the race of an
applicant to a given school. Justice Thomas's opinion in United States v.
Fordice addressed the issue of educational justifications for allowing the
State of Mississippi to operate historically black institutions among its
diverse assortment of colleges and universities. Both opinions also stressed
90. Unless these cultural problems are discussed solely as educational problems.
91. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
[23:63
DILEMMA OF LEGAL DISCOURSE
the importance of government respecting the individuality of applicants to
the schools. That individuality, however, was affirmed in different ways
by these two opinions.
a. Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke
I have already discussed Powell's opinion in Bakke.' The reason I
discussed it then was to show how he moved from a conception of the
Equal Protection Clause that could recognize groups, to one that viewed
society as a collection of individuals. In this section, I will discuss
Powell's opinion to show how he found non-racial educational justifications
for what could also be viewed as race-conscious decision-making in the
admissions process.
In addressing the U.C. Davis affirmative action program, Powell
applied strict scrutiny. Powell indicated that to survive strict scrutiny,
U.C. Davis had to establish a purpose or interest that was both
constitutionally permissible and substantial. In addition to demonstrating
such a use, it was also necessary for U.C. Davis to establish that its
classification of people was necessary for accomplishing that purpose or
safeguarding that interest.93 Davis argued that its special admission
program was to serve four purposes: (1) reduce the historic deficit of
traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical
profession; (2) counter the effects of societal discrimination; (3) increase
the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently
underserved; and (4) obtain the educational benefits that flow from an
ethnically diverse student body.'
Justice Powell found only the fourth asserted purpose to be substantial
enough to support the use of a suspect classification. Such a purpose is
consistent with the notion of academic freedom which, though not
specifically enumerated as a constitutional right, has long been viewed as a
special concern of the First Amendment.95 The atmosphere of speculation,
experiment, and creation that is widely thought to be essential to the quality
of higher education is generally thought promoted by a diverse student
body. Thus, a diverse student body provides a better atmosphere for the
robust exchange of ideas that improves the educational environment.
When U.C. Davis evoked the educational justification for its use of a
suspect classification, it was seeking to achieve a goal that it viewed as
92. See supra notes 60-76.
93. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978).
94. Id. at 306.
95. Id. at 312.
19941
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
being of paramount importance to the fulfillment of its educational
mission."
Powell accepted the notion that the exercise of educational expertise
gives colleges and universities the discretion to use a suspect classification
in order to obtain a certain amount of diversity. This discretion, however,
is limited when applied to suspect classifications.' According to Powell,
the diversity that furthers the compelling state interest encompasses a far
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic
origin is but a single, though important, element.
Powell stressed the importance of examining each student's application
individually in order to scrutinize whether a particular applicant advanced
the racially and ethnically neutral concept of diversity in education. The
use of racial or ethnic set-asides could actually reduce the ability of a
school to obtain that diversity. Using race or ethnicity as a positive factor,
rather than to meet a quota, allows the school to compare the minority's
application with that of the other students. In that way, the entire file of
each particular minority applicant can be scrutinized to determine whether
it contributes more to the diversity of the student body than the application
of say an Italian-American.9
Powell's opinion recognizes that legitimate educational justifications
exist to take race into account in limited situations. This limited
consideration of race in the admissions process can be viewed as an
educational decision which has racial implications, instead of a racial
decision with educational implications. Viewing the decision as one that is
motivated primarily by educational concerns has important consequences
for the constraints of governmental neutrality within the individualistic
framework. Powell stressed that considering each applicant on an
individual basis was important as this is necessary to assure that the school
respects the individuality of each and every applicant for admission. Thus,
public educational experts can apply their expertise in order to deliver an
improved and more effective educational product. By improving the
educational environment, this limited consideration of race advances the
interest of all students enrolled in such programs. Accordingly, legitimate
educational decisions do not violate the requirements of governmental
neutrality even though they may have racial implications.
96. Id. at 313.
97. Id. at 314.
98. d. at 317.
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b. Justice Thomas's opinion in United States v. Fordice
In United States v. Fordice, " the Supreme Court addressed for the first
time the obligation of a state to eradicate the vestiges of a segregated school
system within the state's universities. Over the years, the state of
Mississippi had established eight publicly funded universities. Five were
established for white students and three were established for African-
American students."°° In 1975, a group of African-American citizens
brought a class action suit against the State of Mississippi and claimed that
the state maintained racial segregation in its dual system of higher
education.'0" Efforts to negotiate a settlement eventually collapsed because
the parties could not agree on whether the state had taken sufficient steps to
dismantle its dual school system. As late as 1986, the faculty and student
bodies of these universities were overwhelmingly drawn from the same
racial group that the universities were originally established to serve.1"2
Nevertheless, Mississippi contended that it had fulfilled its duty to
dismantle the dual system by implementing and maintaining in good faith
nondiscriminatory policies in student admissions, faculty hiring, and
operations. "o3
The district court and the court of appeals en banc agreed with the
state's arguments." The Supreme Court, however, vacated the decision of
99. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
100. The three universities established for blacks were Jackson State University,
Alcorn State University and Mississippi Valley State University. The five universities
established for whites were University of Mississippi, Mississippi State University,
Mississippi University for Women, University of Southern Mississippi and Delta State
University.
101. Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990), aff'd en banc, 914 F.2d 676 (5th
Cir. 1990), vacated sub nom. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992). The
United States intervened as a plaintiff.
102. At that time, 99% of the white students (26,759 out of 26,953) were enrolled in
one of the historically white institutions. Seventy-one percent of the black students (9,125
out of 12,826) were enrolled in one of the historically black institutions. In -addition to
racial imbalance with respect to students, there was also considerable racial imbalance
with respect to faculty. In 1986, less than 5% of the faculty at any of the historically
white institutions were African-American, and yet, their percentage exceeded two-thirds
at the three historically black institutions. Ayers, 893 F.2d at 735-37.
103. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2733.
104. The district court concluded that the affirmative duty in the context of higher
education to dismantle a racially dual system places greater emphasis "on current state
higher education policies and practices in order to insure that such polices and practices
are racially neutral, developed and implemented in good faith, and do not substantially
contribute to the continued racial identifiability of individual institutions." Ayers, 674 F.
(continued)
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the en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case to the lower
court. The remedial duty which the Supreme Court imposed on states in
the university context focuses on the specific policies and practices of the
state's university system. The Court held:
[If] the State perpetuates policies and practices traceable to
its prior [dual university] system that continue to have
segregative effects-whether by influencing student
enrollment decisions or by fostering segregation in other
facets of the university system-and such policies are
without sound educational justification and can be
practicably eliminated, the State has not satisfied its burden
of proving that it has dismantled its prior system. 05
The latter part of the Court's opinion applied the test articulated above
to four policies and practices of the present Mississippi university system."°
One of the policies highlighted by the Court was Mississippi's operation of
eight universities, five for whites and three for blacks. The Court
concluded that based on the record, it was unable to say whether it was
necessary to close any of the universities. The Court's opinion, however,
made it clear that Mississippi could not upgrade its historically black
colleges "so that they may be publicly financed, exclusively black enclaves
by private choice.' " 7 Nevertheless, the Court avoided explicitly
addressing the possibility of whether the operation of a historically black
college, as such, could fit within the determination of sound educational
policies. On remand, it directed the lower court to carefully explore
Supp. at 1554. When the district court applied this standard to the university system it
found that there was no current violation of federal law. Id. at 1554-64. "In summary,
the court finds that current actions on the part of the defendants demonstrate conclusively
that the defendants are fulfilling their affirmative duty to disestablish the former de jure
segregated system of higher education." Id. at 1564.
The court of appeals rehearing en banc affirmed the decision by the district court.
With a single exception it did not disturb the district court's findings of fact or conclusions
of law. Ayers, 914 F.2d at 682-89. The court of appeals agreed that Mississippi was
constitutionally required to eliminate invidious racial distinctions and dismantle its dual
system. Id. "That duty has been discharged because the record makes clear that
Mississippi has adopted and implemented race neutral policies for operating its colleges
and universities and that all students have real freedom of choice to attend the college or
university they wish." Id. at 678.
105. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2737.
106. The four policies were admission standards, program duplication, institutional
mission assignments, and continued operation of all eight public universities. Id. at 2738.
107. Id. at 2743.
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whether the maintenance of each of these universities is educationally
justifiable.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote to specifically address
the issue of historically black colleges. He emphasized the fact that the
Court's opinion did not portend either the destruction of historically black
colleges or the severance of those institutions from their distinctive histories
and traditions. He noted that the Court's opinion does "not foreclose the
possibility that there exists sound educational justification for maintaining
historically black colleges as such."' 8 Thomas went on to note that a state,
though not constitutionally required, is not forbidden from operating "a
diverse assortment of institutions-including historically black institutions-
open to all on a race-neutral basis, but with established traditions and
programs that might disproportionately appeal to one race or another. No
one, I imagine, would argue that such institutional diversity is without
'sound educational justification.' "9
Justice Thomas may be reading a permissiveness into the majority
opinion which is unwarranted." Nevertheless, his opinion, like that of
Justice Powell, formally respects the constraints of governmental neutrality
embedded in the individualistic framework. The decision to operate a
108. Id. at 2746 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Thomas praised historically
black colleges because they exercised leadership in developing educational opportunities
for blacks. Mississippi must consider the educational needs of its present and future
students in its university system. Id.
109. Id.
110. Justice Scalia's separate opinion demonstrates that it is quite possible to dispute
Justice Thomas's assertion that this kind of institutional diversity is based on sound
educational policy. Scalia interprets the Court's opinion as rejecting the possibility that a
state may consciously follow a policy of facilitating the continued existence of historically
black colleges. Id. at 2752 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He
argues that no educational policy can justify public universities that cater to a
predominantly black clientele. Id. The only conceivable educational value of fostering
such a policy is the belief that blacks should receive their education in a predominantly
black setting. Id. This would contradict the principle that justified compulsory
integration in Green v. New Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Fordice, 112
S. Ct. at 2752 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice O'Connor also wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 2743 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). She did not specifically mention the issue of the continued maintenance of
historically black colleges, as such, but her opinion seemed to be written with them in
mind. Id. She stressed that Mississippi has a heavy burden to meet if it wishes to
maintain certain remnants of its prior system. Id. She further noted that even if the state
can show that maintenance of certain remnants of its prior system is essential to
accomplish its legitimate goals, then it still must prove that it has counteracted and
minimized the segregative impact of such policies to the extent possible. Id. at 2744.
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diverse assortment of educational institutions including a historically black
college, as such, is viewed by Thomas primarily as an educational decision
with racial implications. This decision must rest upon sound educational
justifications for determining the most appropriate educational institutions
that Mississippi should operate. Since the decision to operate a diverse
assortment of colleges and universities is motivated by educational
considerations, as opposed to racial considerations, it does not advance the
parochial interest of any given racial group or stigmatize any group.
Thomas stresses that the diverse assortment of institutions must be open
to all on a race-neutral basis. With race-neutral admissions policies, the
State of Mississippi would not be treating potential applicants as members
of a racial group. Each applicant is allowed to choose the educational
situation that seems most appropriate to their self-determined goals and
objectives. The open admissions policy, therefore, can be said to respect
the individuality of potential applicants. Any resulting segregation of the
student body would be the product of individual self-determination.
Hence, Thomas's conceptualization of historically black universities
respects the constraint of governmental neutrality embedded within the
individualistic framework.
2. Application of the individualist framework in gender-segregated
schools
The Supreme Court's opinion in Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan." is the primary case addressing the issue of gender-segregated
education." 2 Within the individualist framework, the issue of publicly
funded gender-exclusive schools has been addressed recently in two
different cases by lower federal courts. In United States v. Virginia,"3 the
Fourth Circuit was called upon to address an equal protection challenge to
the state of Virginia's operation of the male-only Virginia Military Institute
("VMI"). The South Carolina district court subsequently applied the
111. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). For an analysis of Hogan, see supra notes 79-84 and
accompanying text.
112. The Court also addressed this issue in Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 430 U.S.
703 (1977) (per curiam). The city of Philadelphia operated a number of coeducational
academically high-tracked high schools. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 881
(3d Cir. 1976). But, Philadelphia segregated the boys from the girls in its best academic
high schools. Id. An evenly divided Court upheld this separate but equal gender
segregated educational practice. 430 U.S. at 703.
113. 976 F.2d. 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993). For the
purposes of this article, this case will be referred to as VML
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Fourth Circuit's ruling after a challenge to the male-only admissions policy
at The Citadel in Faulkner v. Jones.14
a. United States v. Virginia
This case originated on March 1, 1990, when the United States
Department of Justice filed a complaint on behalf of a female high school
student who wanted to be considered for admission to the VMI. Even
though VMI has never accepted applications from women, it received over
300 inquiries from them during the two years prior to the filing of this
action." 5 VMI, which currently enrolls about 1,300 male students, was
established in 1839 as a four-year military college. The complainant in this
action sought an order enjoining the defendants from discriminating on the
basis of gender and requiring them "to formulate, adopt, and fully and
timely implement a plan to remedy fully their discriminatory policies and
practices. " '6
After a six-day trial which commenced on April 4, 1991, the district
court concluded that VMI's male-only admissions policy was fully justified
by a generally accepted benefit found in single-sex education. The court
also concluded that the admission of women would significantly change the
methods of instruction and living conditions. From the outset, Judge Kiser
began his analysis by noting that all parties recognized that the case
concerned educational policy.' The district court rejected the contention
that VMI was analogous to the School of Nursing in Mississippi University
for Woman v. Hogan."8 Unlike the record in Hogan, where the exclusion
of men was not necessary to reach any of MUW's educational goals, the
114. 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994).
115. 976 F.2d at 894.
116. Id.
117. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated,
976 F.2d 890, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1933). Therefore, the district court went on
to see the case as one involving academic freedom, an aspect of the freedom of association
guaranteed by the First Amendment. Id.
The argument could be made that the higher education cases I have discussed, Bakke,
Fordice, and VMI, are not applicable in the Garrett case because in those cases the issue
of academic freedom is involved. The principle of academic freedom is seen as an aspect
of the freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment. Id. at 1409. The
essential requirement for academic freedom of a university is that the university should be
able to choose who may be admitted to study there. This freedom has been recognized by
the Supreme Court and could be seen as the reason to defer to the academic decision-
making by the university. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 n.2
(1978).
118. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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district court concluded that the record in this case was replete with
testimony that single-sex education at the undergraduate level is beneficial
to both males and females." 9 The court stated:
A substantial body of "exceedingly persuasive" evidence
supports VMI's contention that some students, both male
and female, benefit from attending a single-sex college.
For those students, the opportunity to attend a single-sex
college is a valuable one, likely to lead to better academic
and professional achievement....
One empirical study in evidence, ... demonstrates
that single-sex colleges provide better educational
experiences than coeducational institutions. Students of
both sexes become more academically involved, interact
with faculty frequently, show larger increases in
intellectual self-esteem and are more satisfied with
practically all aspects of college experience (the sole
exception is social life) compared with their counterparts in
coeducational institutions. Attendance at an all-male
college substantially increases the likelihood that a student
will carry out career plans in law, business and college
teaching, and also has a substantial positive effect on
starting salaries in business. Women's colleges increase
the chances that those who attend will obtain positions of
leadership, complete the baccalaureate degree and aspire to
higher degrees. 120
The district court noted that the most striking difference, however,
between VMI and Hogan was the justification for the single-gender
admissions policy.' Virginia argued that the male-only admissions policy
at VMI promotes diversity within its statewide system of higher
119. 766 F. Supp. at 1411. The court also noted that the evidence established that
key elements of the adversative VMI educational system would be fundamentally altered
and the distinctive ends of the system thwarted if VMI were forced to accommodate the
needs and interests of women. Id.
120. Id. at 1412 (citing ALEXANDER ASTIN, FOUR CRITICAL YEARS: EFFECTS OF
COLLEGE ON BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND KNOWLEDGE (1977)).
121. The argument used by the State of Mississippi to justify the single-sex
admissions policy of MUW's School of Nursing was that it compensated for
discrimination against women and, therefore, constituted educational affirmative action.
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727.
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education.' The district court concluded that diversity in education was a
legitimate state interest. The district court also found that "both VMI's
single-sex status and its distinctive educational method represent legitimate
contributions to diversity in the Virginia higher education system and that
excluding women is substantially related to this mission."'2 The addition
of women to VMI would undermine its uniqueness.
The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the case for further
consideration by the district court. 2 4 The Fourth Circuit stated:
The argument by the government that VMI's existing
program is maintained as the result of impermissible
stereotyping and overly broad generalizations, without a
more detailed analysis, might lead, if accepted, to a
finding that would impose a conformity that common
experience rejects. Men and women are different, and our
knowledge about the differences, physiological and
psychological, is becoming increasingly more sophisticated.
Indeed the evidence in this case amply demonstrated that
single-genderedness in education can be pedagogically
justifiable.'25
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that the data supports
pedagogical justifications for single-sex education and that such single-sex
education appears to benefit men and women in a similar manner.'26 The
Fourth Circuit concluded, however, that despite the Commonwealth of
Virginia's announced policy of diversity, it failed to articulate an important
policy that substantially supported offering the unique benefits of a VMI-
type of education to men and not to women.'27 The Fourth Circuit
remanded the case to the district court to give the Commonwealth the
responsibility of selecting a course of action that satisfies the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Fourth Circuit indicated that the Commonwealth might
"decide to admit women to VMI and adjust the program to implement that
122. 766 F. Supp. at 1411.
123. Id. at 1413.
124. 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
125. Id. at 897 (emphasis added). The court also cited ALEXANDER ASTIN, FOUR
CRITICAL YEARS: EFFECTS OF COLLEGE ON BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND KNOWLEDGE
(1977). It also cited to a study conducted by Marvin Bressler and Peter Wendell, The Sex
Composition of Selective Colleges and Gender Differences in Career Aspirations, 51 J.
HIGHER EDUC. 650 (1980).
126. 976 F.2d. at 897-98.
127. Id. at 898.
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choice, or it might establish parallel institutions or parallel programs, or it
might abandon state support to VMI and leave it the option of pursuing its
own policies as a private institution. "28
The suggestion by the Fourth Circuit that establishing a parallel
program for women would comply with the Equal Protection Clause must
be further examined. This suggestion can be construed as respecting the
constraints of governmental neutrality embedded in the individualist
framework. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit stressed the fact
that the decision to establish and maintain gender-segregated educational
programs was based upon pedagogical justifications. Thus, it was an
educational decision with gender implications and not a gender decision
with educational implications.
Parallel gender-segregated schools would respect the self-determination
of potential applicants because those who applied would do so only for
their own individual reasons. If a particular person preferred a
coeducational college, that would also be available. Thus, Virginia would
be multiplying the higher education options available to both men and
women. Since the option of gender-segregated education is available to
both male and female applicants, the interests of both are being advanced.
Hence, parallel gender-segregated institutions would not favor the
parochial interest of one gender group over another. Thus, government
sponsored parallel gender-segregated schools could be seen as consistent
with the constraint of governmental neutrality.
There is a major argument concerning the ability to establish a new
parallel program for women that would be the equivalent of VMI. The
Court addressed this issue in the context of race in one of the graduate
school cases during the separate but equal era that preceded Brown I. In
Sweatt v. Painter,'29 Heman Marion Sweatt's application for admission to
the University of Texas Law School in Austin was rejected solely because
he was black. Texas had established a separate law school for African-
Americans and argued that Sweatt could receive an education there that
was comparable to that offered by the University of Texas. In an opinion
authored by Chief Justice Vinson, the Court rejected the notion that a
newly formed school would provide Sweatt with an education equivalent to
that of the University of Texas Law School. In addition to the disparity
128. Id. at 900 (emphasis added).
129. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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between the two schools with regard to tangible factors, Vinson also noted
intangible factors:
What is more important, the University of Texas Law
School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities
which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to
name but a few, include reputation of the faculty,
experience of the administration, position and influence of
the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige. 130
A newly-formed, gender-segregated college established for women can
duplicate the physical attributes of VMI. Such a school, however, cannot
possibly hope to duplicate the intangibles that attach to a school like VMI,
which has a 150-year history. A counter-argument can be advanced that a
parallel VMI for women is distinguishable from Sweatt v. Painter. Texas
was only allowing Sweatt to attend the law school set up for blacks. Thus,
Sweatt did not also have the other coeducational options that would still be
available to women in Virginia. A parallel VMI for women-though not
necessarily equal to VMI-may, nevertheless, amount to substantial
equality.
b. Faulkner v. Jones
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in VMI was followed by a federal district
court in South Carolina in Faulkner v. Jones. ' Shannon Faulkner's
application for admission to The Citadel was originally granted when they
thought she was a male, but was later rejected after they learned of her
gender. On March 2, 1993, Faulkner instituted an action against The
Citadel and others. 13
2
The Citadel is a publicly funded military college in South Carolina that
was established in 1842. Since that time, the primary mission of the school
has been to educate male undergraduates as members of the South Carolina
Corps of Cadets and to prepare them for post-graduate positions of
leadership. The Citadel accomplishes its mission by providing academic
130. Id. at 634.
131. 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994).
132. Faulkner sued members of the Board of Visitors of The Citadel, Wallace I.
West, Jr., Director of Admissions and Recruiting at The Citadel, and Claudius E. Watts,
III, President of The Citadel. Id. at 555. On June 7, 1993, the United States of America
was permitted to intervene as a plaintiff and the State of South Carolina, The Citadel and
the Citadel's Board of Visitors were added as defendants. Id.
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programs of recognized excellence supported by the best features of a
disciplined military environment. '33 The Citadel has never admitted women
to its day program. Its coeducational night program does, however, offer
some baccalaureate degree programs.
In addition to The Citadel, South Carolina operates eleven other public
colleges and universities all of which are coeducational."3 There are also
twenty, four-year private colleges operating in South Carolina. All of
these are coeducational, with the exception of two which are female-only
colleges. The Citadel is, therefore, the only all male college in the state of
South Carolina.
Until 1974, South Carolina had maintained a female-only college-
Winthrop College, The South Carolina College for Women. Its board of
trustees, however, decided to convert it to a coeducational institution. The
district court found that the college did not become coeducational to
discriminate against women. Rather, the primary reason was to serve the
educational needs of the citizens of South Carolina better, particularly those
within the geographical area of Winthrop College, by providing better
programs, better faculty, and better facilities. Another reason, however,
was the college's declining enrollment. 3 '
Since the defendants agreed that the Fourth Circuit's opinion in the
VMI case applied, the only relevant issue was whether there existed a
distinction between South Carolina's situation with The Citadel and
Virginia's situation with VMI. Unlike Virginia, South Carolina argued that
it could advance a justification for limiting the benefit of gender-segregated
education only to males. The defendants argued that at the time, the
demand for single-gender education for women in South Carolina was fully
met by the two private women's colleges in the state. Some female South
Carolina students at these colleges received public financial support
through the state's Tuition Grants Program.'36  Therefore, the state's
justification for not providing the benefit of a public gender-segregated
college for women was that there was an inadequate demand.
133. Id.
134. In the fall of 1993, 32,642 women and 22,831 men were enrolled in South
Carolina's public institutions of higher education. Id. at 560. Approximately 2,000 of the
men were enrolled at The Citadel. Id.
135. Id. at 556.
136. South Carolina's budget for higher education is $650,000,000. Id. at 557.
Seventeen million dollars of that is set aside for a Tuition Grants Program, which
provides 6,606 students with an average grant of $2,529 in 1993. Id.
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The district court correctly rejected this argument, as the rights of the
Equal Protection Clause are personal and individual; it is not women, the
gender, but Shannon Faulkner, the individual, who is entitled to equal
protection.'" The court stated that a lack of demand for a certain type of
equal protection cannot be used as a justification for denying an
individual's right, because this would deny the very basis of the right.
3. Structure of and arguments for public educational programs that
assist African-American males
If public educational programs are directed towards assisting only
African-American males, then government is engaged in the process of
making decisions motivated by racial and gender considerations that
advance the parochial interest of black males. Even though the aggregate
statistics pointing to the conditions of African-American males in public
schools may show that their performance is substandard as a group, as
Justice O'Connor noted in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, more than
just statistical disparity is needed.' When one sees the analysis of the
Equal Protection Clause within the individualist framework, the reason
becomes clear. For in this framework, it is the individual that matters and
not conditions of the racial and gender groups. Therefore, the existence of
statistical disparity among such groups is largely irrelevant, because
focusing upon such statistics requires that we reject the fundamental view
of the individualist framework.'39 In short, any statistical disparity between
race or gender is not a recognizable concept, unless it is the result of
intentional discriminatory conduct.'40
137. The district court cited one of the Supreme Court's pre-Brown I graduate school
cases, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). Faulkner, 858 F. Supp.
at 564. In that case, the State of Missouri operated a law school for whites, but not for
blacks. Missouri ex rel. Gaines, 305 U.S. at 342. The law school rejected the plaintiffs
application for admission because he was black. Id. Though Missouri offered to pay the
plaintiff's tuition to any law school in an adjacent state, Missouri argued that it did not
need to provide him with a law school in the State of Missouri, because there was an
insufficient demand for a separate law school for blacks. Id. The Supreme Court rejected
that argument noting that the plaintiff's rights were individual and that he, not his race,
was entitled to equal protection of the laws. Id. at 351.
138. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 620 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
139. See McClesky v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 898-900 (1 th Cir. 1985).
140. The Supreme Court has previously rejected a number of potential arguments for
satisfying the compelling state interest prong of strict scrutiny. It has rejected the notion
that societal discrimination could be used to establish a compelling state interest, because
it is too vague. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497
(continued)
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Even though the individualist framework will be hostile to efforts
targeted solely for the benefit of black males, that does not exhaust the
ability of school officials to structure programs that might allow them to
assist this group. In order to provide programs to assist African-American
males that fit within the constraints of this framework, a certain amount of
imprecision is required. These programs must necessarily respect the
individuality of all students and be broad enough to encompass more than
just the interests of black male students.
Public school officials could seek to establish separate schools or
classrooms for both males and females based upon legitimate educational
concerns.' 4' In a predominantly minority school system, it will be easier to
isolate black males because race is not an issue.'42 Conversely, in a multi-
racial school system the issue will be more complicated. School officials
would probably have to decide to set up a number of gender-segregated
schools located in various areas of the school district in order to isolate
African-American males in a given school.
The justification for such programs should be the benefits derived by
some students (males and females) from gender-segregated education.
There are a number of studies that have suggested positive educational
benefits can accrue to both males and females from gender-segregated
education.'43 The school district could tailor the education of both males
(1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276-77 (1986) (rejecting societal
discrimination as a compelling justification for racial classifications made in the context of
public education); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 297-98 (1978).
The Supreme Court has also rejected an argument that could have justified race-based
decision-making in public education by pointing to the needs of African-American
children to see minority school teachers who could act as role models. The so-called role
model theory was argued and rejected in Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275-76.
141. In addition to the possible equal protection violations, there is also a possible
violation of Title VI and Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §
1681 (1990). There may also be state antidiscrimination statutes that might restrict or
prohibit the institution of governmental programs for the benefit of black males.
142. A recent report issued by the National School Boards Association indicated that
racial segregation, which had remained relatively stable from 1972 through the late 1980s,
has begun to increase. In 1991, 66% of African-American school children attended
predominantly minority schools, up from 63% in 1986. Latinos are even more
concentrated in predominantly minority schools. The proportion of Latinos in minority-
dominated schools has increased from 54% in 1968, to 73% in 1991. William J. Eaton,
Segregation Creeping Back in U.S. Schools, S. F. CHRON., Dec. 14, 1993, at A15.
143. See, e.g., ALEXANDER W. ASTIN; FOUR CRITICAL YEARS: EFFECTS OF COLLEGE
ON BELIEFS, ATrITUDES, AND KNOWLEDGE (1977); Marvin Bressler & Peter Wendell, The
Sex Composition of Selective Colleges and Gender Differences in Career Aspirations, 51
J. HIGHER EDUC. 650 (1980).
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and females in order to address the academic concerns which affect them
differently. Since educational considerations motivate the establishment of
these programs, school officials would not be engaging in social
engineering.' Instead, they would be providing alternative forms of
education for all students. School officials could be viewed as exercising
their expertise in the decision to establish such programs. Hence, the
decision to set up such a program could be considered an educational
decision with gender implications.
Attendance at these programs should be left to the individual choice of
parents and students. Providing the option of gender-segregated education
to all students respects the individuality of each student. This option adds
diversity to the educational choices available to all students and, thereby,
helps them and their parents to select the most appropriate educational
setting for the student.
A public school system which is seeking to establish separate but equal
gender-segregated schools would probably not face the potential equality
argument that could be advanced against Virginia and South Carolina.
Since the male and female programs would both be new, the equality
analysis of the programs will be limited. The analysis is much more likely
to focus primarily upon objective factors which the public school system
can control."14
144. One can see this argument in Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. Davis argued
that its special admission program was to serve four purposes: (1) reducing the historic
deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical
profession; (2) countering the effects of societal discrimination; (3) increasing the number
of physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved; and (4) obtaining
the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body. Justice Powell
addressed each of the four purposes separately to determine if they were substantial
enough to support the use of a suspect classification. Given the structure of the U. C.
Davis program, he found that the first three purposes did not justify the use of a suspect
classification. This is in part because these purposes are outside of the expertise and
responsibilities of educators. The fourth purpose-which Justice Powell concluded was
compelling enough to justify racial classification-was not. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311.
145. Even if this is done, it is still an uphill argument to convince a court that the
individualist framework does apply. Plenty of scholars and judges have criticized Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke as one that violated the individualist notion of governmental
neutrality. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: "In order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race, "47 WASH. U. L.Q. 147 (1979).
In United States v. Fordice, Justice Scalia's separate opinion shows that it is possible
to dispute Justice Thomas's assertion that there could be sound educational justifications
for maintaining historically black colleges as such. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct.
2727, 2752 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
interpreted the same majority opinion for the Supreme Court that Justice Thomas did. He
(continued)
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III. THE TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Supreme Court has a long judicial history of employing a
traditional analysis when addressing racial issues. The traditional
framework rejects the view of society as a collection of knowing
individuals. Instead, its basic organizing premise is that society is
composed of knowing individuals who are Caucasians of European descent
or involuntary members of various substandard groups, such as African-
Americans. The pre-Brown I use of the traditional framework provided the
conceptual basis for justifying slavery and de jure segregation. The post-
Brown I use of the traditional framework justified special remedial
programs to ameliorate the presumed deficiencies of African-Americans.
The Supreme Court has used a traditional analysis to address the
legality of separate treatment for African-Americans. This framework,
however, should be irrelevant when the focus is on separate treatment for
males. 46 The Supreme Court's historical jurisprudence has not viewed
concluded that the majority would not allow the state to consciously follow a policy of
advancing programs that perpetuate historically black colleges as such, even if it
determined admissions in a racially neutral manner. Id. He argues that a policy to
provide public universities that cater to a predominantly black clientele could not be
justified as an exercise of sound educational policy. Id. Justice Scalia went on to note
that the only conceivable educational value of fostering such programs and policies is the
belief that blacks should receive their education in a predominantly black setting. Id.
Which is to say that Justice Scalia did not see such a decision as an educational decision
with racial implications, but rather as a racially motivated decision with educational
implications.
146. The Court has used a pejorative framework in the past which views women in
some relevant way as less than men. A good example is the Supreme Court's opinion in
Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). In Bradwell, the Court refused to find a
constitutional right of a woman to practice law. Myra Bradwell applied to the State of
Illinois for admission to the bar, but was denied because of her gender. The Supreme
Court of Illinois stated that "as a married woman [she] would be bound neither by her
express contracts nor by those implied contracts which it is the policy of the law to create
between attorney and client." Id. at 131. The Supreme Court of Illinois in a subsequent
proceeding went on to state that the Legislature did not intend women to be lawyers when
it passed regulations on admission to the Illinois state bar. Id. at 132. The Court
explained that at the time the law was passed the belief that "God designed the sexes to
occupy different spheres of action and that it belonged to men to make, apply and execute
laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth." Id.
Bradwell argued that the limitation by Illinois of the practice of law to just males was
a denial of one of her privileges as a citizen of the United States under the Privileges and
Immunity Clause of the 14th Amendment. Id. at 133. The Court rejected the notion that
practicing law was a privilege of a citizen of the United States, but found it was rather a
privilege of the state in which the person resided. Id. at 139. Therefore Illinois could
determine the appropriate qualifications to practice law. Id.
(continued)
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males as substandard. In the context of public educational programs to
address the plight of African-American males, the traditional framework
will be applicable not because these individuals are males but because they
are black. Since the conceptual focus within this framework is on African-
Americans as a group, the condition of black females is not seen as being
separate from that of black males. As a consequence, public school
officials will find it difficult to justify programs only for black males
without providing similar alternative programs for black females.
The Supreme Court has not officially adopted the traditional
framework as explicitly as I will discuss it. The application of this
framework will instead take the form of discussing what constitutes
compelling justifications for racial classification under strict scrutiny. For
intermediate scrutiny, the traditional framework will masquerade in the
discussion concerning what constitutes important governmental interests for
gender-based decision-making. With regard to public educational
programs that could assist black males, this framework will probably be
applied only in a public school system like Detroit, where the student
population is predominately black.
A. The Conceptual Structure
The Supreme Court did not develop the traditional framework in a
vacuum. It was developed against the backdrop of a long history of
constitutional jurisprudence that recognized African-Americans as a distinct
Justice Bradley in his concurring opinion justified the conclusion that women should
not practice law by finding it was inconsistent with the role that women should play. Id.
at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as the nature of things, indicated the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views
which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant
to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career
from that of her husband ....
' . * The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of
the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the
general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional
cases.
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class. This distinctiveness was used to justify different and generally
subordinating treatment of African-Americans because of their race. The
Court's recognition of racial difference has almost always been based upon
an explicit or implicit notion that blacks in some important ways were less
than whites.
The underlying conception of the social world within this framework
rejects the individualist conception of society as a collection of knowing
individuals. Instead, the traditional framework views society as being
composed of knowing individuals (primarily Caucasians of European
ancestry) and involuntary members of various substandard groups.
African-Americans would be one such substandard group. According to
the traditional framework, African-Americans are conceptualized as less
than the applicable norm in some relevant way. It may be that due to the
Supreme Court's opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,'47 we
are in a period where arguments within the traditional framework will no
longer satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. At this time, however, the
Court's jurisprudence addressing racial classifications employs strict
scrutiny and, at least officially, has not accepted the colorblind analysis that
the individualist framework implies.' 48
The modem version of the traditional framework, when applied to
African-Americans, is based upon the notion that the experience of racial
147. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that strict scrutiny applies to all racial
classifications by governmental entities, regardless of the intended beneficiaries).
148. See, e.g., id. at 497-98 (rejecting a number of arguments that could have created
a compelling state,- interest including societal discrimination and the historic
underrepresentation of minorities in the construction industry); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276-77 (1986) (rejecting societal discrimination as a compelling
justification for racial classifications, made in the context of public education); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 297-98 (1978). According to Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Metro Broadcasting, the only compelling state interest
that may justify racial classifications as indicated by the Supreme Court, is remedying the
effects of identifiable and proven acts of discrimination. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 611 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
In addition to the difficulty the Supreme Court's relevant precedent has created in
providing a cqtnpelling state interest, the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny also
provides an additional hurdle. According to the Court's opinion in Croson, the narrow
tailored aspect prevents the use of illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotypes as the basis
for such decisions. 488 U.S. at 493. Even though racial generalizations may have some
empirical basis, they inevitably do not apply to all African-Americans. Metro
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 620. Hence, attempting to cite negative social statistics about
the social or educational performance of blacks (males) as a group runs the risk of failing
narrow tailoring, because the argument can be made that basing decisions on the use of
such statistical evidence amounts to stereotyping.
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subordination, including slavery and segregation, has negatively impacted
African-Americans. The result of this historical experience has currently
produced a group of people who are still handicapped by and suffering
from the psychological, emotional, and economic scars engendered by that
experience. At its most charitable level, this framework would accept the
notion that African-Americans should not be held responsible for their
current deficit condition; nevertheless, it views African-Americans as
deficient in some relevant way.
B. The Constitutional Historical Development
1. The traditional framework prior to Brown v. Board of Education
The antecedents of the modem version of the traditional framework are
rooted in America's antebellum and segregation eras. Most of the legal
history of black/white race relations in this country is a story of
recognizing blacks as members of a distinct group in order to subordinate
them."'49 The first known report of blacks to arrive in what was to become
the United States comes from a log kept by John Rolfe of the Virginia
colony. He wrote in 1619 "there came to Virginia a Dutchman of Warre
that sold us twenty Negers. ,150
By the time the founding fathers began the task of drafting the
Constitution, the former colonies had over 150 years of experience with
blacks. In the Declaration of Independence, the founders boldly declared
that all men were created equal and "endowed with ... unalienable rights
[that include] ...Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."' Despite this
149. A number of books have been written to address the history of racial
subordination. See, e.g., WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968); JOHN H. FRANKLIN & ALFRED A.
MOss JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS (6th ed.
1988); IRVING J. SLOAN, THE BLACKS IN AMERICA 1492-1971: A CHRONOLOGY & FACT
BOOK (1977); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978).
150. Captaine John Smith, The Generall Historie of Virginia, New England and the
Summer Isles, Vol. 1, 246-47 (Glasgow, James MacLehose & Sons 1907), reprinted in
CIVIL RIGHTS AND AFRICAN AMERICANS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 4 (Albert P.
Blaustein & Robert L. Zangrando eds., 1991). Scholars have been unable to agree on
whether the first 20 Africans were slaves or indentured servants. The legal status of
blacks in Virginia from 1619-1660 was also unclear. There is, however, general
agreement that they were presumed to be "less than" caucasians and thus were subject to
discriminatory treatment. For a brief discussion of this treatment in Virginia, see Bryan
K. Fair, Foreword: Rethinking the Colorblindness Model, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 13-18
(1993); see also KULL, supra note 31, at 1-6.
151. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
1994]
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
egalitarian language, the document protected slavery implicitly. It was not
considered contradictory to write such words, yet accept the institution of
slavery, because of the almost universal belief in the "less than" nature of
black slaves.' 52  The implicit protection of slavery and concomitant
recognition of black's subordinate status found in the Declaration of
Independence was explicitly written into the United States Constitution in
1787.53 For example, the Constitution treated slaves as three-fifths of a
person for purposes of apportioning representatives and taxes among the
various states; 54 forbade Congress from eliminating the slave trade until at
least 1808;' and included a fugitive slave clause requiring that when a
slave escaped to another state he was to be returned on the claim of his
master. 156
The best example of the Supreme Court's explicit recognition of the
subordinate status and nature of blacks during the antebellum period was
Chief Justice Taney's (in)famous opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford.'57 Dred
Scott had been taken by his master from the slaveholding state of Missouri
into the state of Illinois and the Wisconsin Territory. Slavery was
prohibited by state law in Illinois and had been prohibited by Congress in
the Wisconsin Territory.' After his owner's death, Scott sued the heirs to
obtain his freedom. He claimed that the time he resided in a free state and
the Wisconsin Territory had effectively worked to emancipate him. When
the Missouri Supreme Court rejected his claim he turned to the federal
court, invoking diversity of citizenship as the basis for federal
jurisdiction.5 9 Chief Justice Taney's opinion concluded that people of
African descent were not considered citizens within the definition of the
Constitution. Thus, Scott did not possess the requisite qualifications to gain
access to the federal courts. In interpreting the Founding Father's intent,
Taney noted the following:
[Blacks] had for more than a century before [the
Declaration of Independence] been regarded as beings of
152. THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 336-41 (James Madison) (The New American
Library ed., 1961).
153. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 389 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
156. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
157. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
158. Id. at 487.
159. Dred Scott sued as a Missouri citizen against his master who was a resident of
New York.
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an inferior order, altogether unfit to associate with the
white race, either in social or political relations; and so far
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect .... 6"
Taney merely based his decision on what was generally understood at
the time, that blacks were not the equal of whites. Taney went on to state
in this opinion that blacks had been stigmatized with "deep and enduring
marks of inferiority and degradation. '''6' For Taney's opinion in Dred
Scott and the American society for which it was crafted, this inequality
justified relegating blacks to the position of an inferior racial caste. Slavery
was an effective way in which the inequality of African-Americans could
be managed. 62
160. Id. at 407.
161. Id. at 416.
162. There was general agreement, both in the North and the South, about the
inferiority of blacks. While slavery was the way to manage the Negro in the South, in the
North his inferiority was managed through segregation.
Segregation, in complete and fully developed form, grew up contemporaneously with
slavery, but it did so in the North, not the South. Although blacks were generally not
bought and sold in the North, their freedom was circumscribed in many ways. Blacks
found themselves systematically separated from whites on railway cars, omnibuses,
stagecoaches and steamboats. When permitted to attend, they sat in secluded and remote
corners of theaters and lecture halls. They could not enter most hotels, restaurants, and
resorts, except of course as servants. They prayed in "negro pews" in white churches,
and if they were to partake of the Eucharist, it was after the whites had been served their
bread and wine. Blacks were often segregated in schools, punished in separate prisons,
nursed in separate hospitals and buried in separate cemeteries.
By custom and law, Negroes were excluded from jury service throughout the North.
Indiana, Illinois and Oregon all incorporated constitutional provisions restricting the
admission of Negroes into their borders. In 1860, only 6% of the northern Negroes lived
in the five states-Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine and Rhode Island-
that allowed them to vote.
Abraham Lincoln also knew the feeling of the great masses of white people in the
North about blacks. In 1858, he stated the following:
I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been in favor of bringing
about in any way the social and political equality of white and black
races-that I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or
jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to
intermarry with white people, and I will say in addition to this that
there is a physical difference between the black and white races which
I believe will for ever forbid the two races living together on terms of
social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live,
while they do remain together there must be the position of superior
(continued)
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In December of 1865, only eight months after Robert E. Lee
surrendered to General Grant at the courthouse in Appomattox, the
Thirteenth Amendment was formerly ratified and chattel slavery was
constitutionally abolished. The abolition of slavery, however, did not
imply that the freedmen should be granted rights co-extensive with those of
whites. The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment bestowed upon blacks
the status of citizenship in the United States and the State where they
resided, prohibited States from abridging their privileges or immunities as
citizenis of the United States, and granted them the equal protection of the
laws. From the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, it was
clear that whatever it granted, it did not grant blacks the right to vote. 63
Hence, equal protection did not mean that blacks were in all instances to be
given the same rights as whites. It took the passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment to constitutionalize the prohibition against discrimination in
voting based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude."4
The concept of equal rights in the view of the post-Civil War United
States was not interpreted by the Supreme Court in the latter decades of the
19th century to mean equality in the way it is understood within the
individualist framework today. As pointed out by Professor Hovenkamp,
post-Civil War America distinguished civil and political equality from
social equality."6 To have political and civil equality was to have the same
basic human rights against the state that the white person possessed. These
rights included the right to own property, to vote, to plead in court, and to
share equally in the costs and benefits of government."6 Social equality
was a right asserted not against the state, but against one's fellow citizens.
According to the thinking of the time, there was an important distinction
between a black person who wanted to serve on a jury and one who wanted
to attend an integrated school. 67 Voting only required that government
and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the
superior position assigned to the white race.
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 21 (3d rev. ed. 1974). For a
discussion of the conditions of blacks north of the Mason-Dixon line, see generally LEON
F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860 (1961).
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
164. For a discussion of the political situation that spurred Congress to push for
enfranchisement of the freedmen, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 239-80 (1988).
165. Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 624.
166. Id. at 648.
167. The same Congress that voted for the Fourteenth Amendment also established
(continued)
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recognize the right of the person to do so, but attending an integrated
school presumably required that the black person be able to impose his
desires on a white person. Hence, social rights were understood as being
asserted at the expense of someone else and not just the government.
It was with the understanding that social rights could be distinguished
from political rights that the Supreme Court in 1879 was able to strike
down a law that restricted jury duty to white males.168 And yet, four years
later, the Court struck down certain provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1875 that entitled all persons, especially blacks, to the full and equal
enjoyment of public places of amusement including: accommodations,
advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, public conveyance on land or
water, and theaters. 69 The former case was understood by the Court to be
about civil or political rights, because the issues in the case involved only
assertion of rights against the state. In the latter case, however, the Court
felt that it was addressing a statute that required private individuals to
recognize the rights of blacks. The Court viewed the provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 as infringing upon social rights of those business
owners.
The pre-eminent case of the segregation era, Plessy v. Ferguson,
170
legitimated the doctrine of "separate but equal." Justice Brown's opinion
for the Court referred also to the distinction between social rights and civil
and political rights. The Court was presented with a challenge to a statute
that could clearly be seen as motivated by a desire to assert the superiority
of whites and the inferiority of blacks. 7' But, the Court specifically
segregated schools in the District of Columbia.
168. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
169. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
170. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
171. Justice Harlan makes this point in his dissent. Id. at 552-64 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). The Court's opinion in Plessy was in tune with the times. Politics and public
opinion had turned against the attempts at equality fostered by the Reconstruction
Amendments. Alabama and Mississippi had already moved to disenfranchise blacks.
Congress, in 1891, had defeated a bill that would have enlarged federal protection of
blacks seeking to vote in federal elections, and three years after that it repealed virtually
all the Reconstruction statutory projections for the voting rights of blacks. Furthermore,
the Plessy case did not provoke the media reaction the way the Court's decisions in the
Civil Rights Cases thirteen years earlier had. See WOODWARD, supra note 162, at 69-74;
see also Stephen J. Riegel, The Persistent Career of Jim Crow: Lower Federal Courts
and the "Separate but Equal" Doctrine, 1865-1896, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 17 (1984)
(examining federal lower courts' treatment of the issue of separate but equal before Plessy
and concluding from the lower cases that the Court's opinion in Plessy was very
predictable and obvious). The case was not even mentioned in many legal publications
(continued)
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rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit
social distinctions based on race: "[T]he object of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two
races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political equality."'72 The Court further articulated that
"if the civil and political rights of both races be equal one cannot be
inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the
other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon
the same plane." '173 As C. Vann Woodward pointed out, the rationale of
the Court's opinion in Plessy was based on the notion that railroad seating
was in the domain of social relations as opposed to political or civil
rights. "'74 In effect, the Court could recognize both political and civil
equality and, at the same time, the social inferiority of African-Americans.
Acceptance of the notion of African-Americans' social inferiority was
evident three years after Plessy when the Supreme Court decided the case
of Cummings v. Richmond County Board of Education.'75 Even though the
facts of the Cummings case were somewhat unusual and the arguments
made by the plaintiffs were mishandled, Cummings came to stand for the
proposition that equality was not absolute. 76 What the Court did in
and the decision was not reported in either of the United States Supreme Court Reports.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910-21, at 753 (1984).
172. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543.
173. Id. at 552-53.
174. WOODWARD, supra note 162, at 155.
175. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
176. The Richmond County Board of Education had maintained two public high
schools-one for black children charging $10 per year tuition and one for white girls
charging $15 per year tuition. Id. at 531-32. There was a private high school for white
boys that charged $15 per year. Id. at 531. In addition, there were three other private
sectarian schools that would accept black children. Id. at 533. When a shortage of space
developed for black children in primary schools, the school board decided to convert the
black high school into four elementary schools. This deprived 60 black high school
students of an education, but provided space for 300 primary school students. Id. at 533.
The black plaintiffs alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. They sought to
prevent the board of education from collecting any taxes to support the high schools
operated for the exclusive benefit of the white population and to enjoin the board from
using any funds or property, then held by it or thereafter to come into its hands, for
supporting such high schools. Id. at 529-30.
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Harlan, the Court concluded that the
reason for closing the black high school was to provide educational opportunities for some
300 primary school students. Id. at 544. The Court rejected the notion that there was any
(continued)
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Cummings was to sanction a situation where Richmond County had decided
to operate a high school for white girls while providing funding for a high
school for white boys without providing any public high school facilities or
funding for blacks. The Supreme Court's opinion in Berea College v.
Kentucky"7 and Gong Lum v. Rice' went on to seal the Court's
recognition of segregation and its concomitant acceptance of the concept
that in the area of education, African-Americans were "less than" whites
for purposes of applying the Equal Protection Clause.
desire or purpose on the part of the board to discriminate against any of the colored school
children of the county on account of their race. Id. Justice Harlan also indicated that the
relief sought by the black plaintiffs would impair the efficiency of the high school
provided for white children or compel the board to close it. Id. at 545. This result would
take from the white children an educational privilege that had been granted to them,
without providing any benefit for the black children. The Court concluded by noting that
under the circumstances disclosed, it could not say that this action by the state was a
denial of the equal protection of the laws. Id. While all admit that the benefits and
burdens of the public taxation must be shared by citizens without discrimination against
any class on account of their race, the education of the people in schools maintained by
state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective states. Id.
177. 211 U.S. 45 (1908). This case involved the criminal conviction of an
incorporated college that admitted both whites and African-Americans for instruction in
violation of state law which prohibited a corporation from instructing both races at the
same institution. Id. at 46. The issue was whether this statute violated the Federal
Constitution. Id. at 53. The Court found the statute valid and reasoned that it was within
the state's power to create a corporation and thus the state could limit the activities of the
corporation. Id. at 58.
178. 275 U.S. 78 (1927). This was the Court's other major education opinion of the
segregation era. Martha Lum, a nine year old girl, was denied admission into the local
school for whites because of her Chinese ancestry. When the Supreme Court of
Mississippi heard this case it directed its attention towards the proper construction of a
provision in the state's constitution which provided that "[s]eparate schools shall be
maintained for the children of the white and colored races." Rice v. Gong Lum, 104 So.
105 (Miss. 1925). The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that this provision had
divided educable children into those of pure white or caucasian race and those of colored
races of brown, yellow and black. Therefore, Martha Lum could not insist on being
classified as white. Id. Since the Legislature was not compelled to provide separate
schools for each of the colored races, all were given the benefit of a unified colored
school. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court, therefore, denied Martha Lum admission to
the white school. Id.
The Supreme Court noted that the ability of the state to segregate had been decided
many times. Gong Lum, 275 U.S. at 86. Though the issue had generally arisen in the
establishment of separate schools between white and black pupils, the Court did not think
that the question was any different between white and yellow pupils. Id. at 87.
Accordingly, the Court upheld the decision to prevent Martha Lum from being admitted
to the white school.
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2. The traditional framework after Brown v. Board of Education
Ironically, the modern traditional framework can be traced to the very
opinion that most would associate with its demise, Brown v. Board of
Education.79  I have already discussed the individualist framework's
interpretation of Brown ."8O To elucidate the traditional framework's
interpretation of Brown I, it is necessary to read it in conjunction with
Green v. New Kent County. 8' The question of whether more than non-
discrimination measures were required to discharge the burden placed on
school systems by Brown I and Brown II was left open until the Court's
1968 opinion in Green. In Green, the Court stated explicitly that the
obligation placed on public school systems in Brown II to achieve a system
for determining admission on a non-racial basis required school systems to
consider race and achieve a certain amount of racial balancing.
82
Desegregation before Green could be seen as adopting race-neutral
attendance measures such as freedom of choice. After Green, however,
desegregation required that schools take account of their students' race in
order to achieve a balance.'83 In striking down the "freedom of choice"
179. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
180. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
181. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
182. As Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Green stated in its opening,
[T]he question for decision is whether, under all the circumstances
here, respondent School Board's adoption of a 'freedom-of-choice'
plan which allows a pupil to choose his own public school constitutes
adequate compliance with the Board's responsibility "to achieve a
system of determining admission to the public school on a nonracial
basis."
Id. at 432; see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
183. There is traditionally an effort to harmonize the integrationist tradition with the
liberal tradition. As the argument goes, if everyone treats everyone else as an individual
then color simply becomes a description of a purely physical attribute. As a result, since
people will not distinguish one another based on color, integration will naturally follow.
The reason we are not at that point in our society today is because government for a long
time has made racial classification an important determinant of rights and responsibilities.
As a result, for at least an interim period of time, the government should take account of
race in order to reach that goal. For a good example of these arguments, see Paul
Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 728, 741-49 (1986). See also Dworkin, supra note 26, at 175-89.
Given the persistence of race consciousness in our society, it is clear that in the
1990s we have not reached the place where race does not matter. Anyone who accepts
this argument must be prepared to override individual choices for a very long time,
without any demonstrable evidence that we will ever evolve beyond this period of
(continued)
[23:63
DILEMMA OF LEGAL DISCOURSE
plan, the Court placed upon school boards the obligation to achieve racial
balancing now.'" The Court rejected the argument of the New Kent
County School Board that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require
compulsory integration."
Within the individualist framework, the Court might be able to justify
taking account of the race of black children by arguing that all of them,
including those who had yet to attend de jure segregated schools, were
individual victims of intentional racial discrimination. However, the rights
of white students were also affected by school desegregation remedies.
Since these innocent white students, some as young as age 6, could not be
said to have inflicted harm upon the black students, it can be cogently
asserted that school desegregation rested upon assumptions about the social
world that differed from those embedded in the individualist framework.,8 6
The Court's articulated rationale in Green for placing the obligation on
school boards to achieve racial balancing was that "the constitutional rights
of Negro school children articulated in Brown I required the desegregation
of public schools."' 7 To find the rationale articulated by the Supreme
Court for court ordered school desegregation, we must do as the Court
commanded in Green and journey back to Brown I.
Before going back to Brown I, however, I want to emphasize that over
40 years have elapsed since the Supreme Court rendered this opinion on
that famous spring day in 1954. At the time the Court delivered that
opinion, people of African descent were called Negroes out of respect, and
transition.
184. Green, 391 U.S. at 441. Under the "freedom-of-choice" plan, no whites had
enrolled in the black school, and only 15% of blacks had enrolled in the white school. Id.
The Court noted that "transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was
and is the ultimate end to be brought about." Id. at 436. Prior to the Green opinion,
freedom of choice plans were considered sufficient to meet the constitutional obligation
imposed on school systems by Brown 11. One of the provisions included in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibited federal financial assistance from being given to programs or
activities engaged in discrimination. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
issued regulations addressing racial discrimination in federally aided school systems as
directed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988), and in the statement of policies or guidelines,
the department's Office of Education established standards of eligibility for federal funds
of school systems in the process of desegregation. 45 CFR §§ 80.1-80.13, 181.1-181.76
(1976). "Freedom of choice" plans were seen as acceptable under these regulations. See
391 U.S. at 433-34 & n.2; see also GRAGLIA, supra note 44, at 53.
185. Green, 391 U.S. at 437.
186. Mark Yudof, Nondiscrimination and Beyond in School Desegregation, in
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 97, 106 (1980).
187. 391 U.S. at 438.
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they were called nigger, darkie, and even black as an insult. America had
not yet experienced the Civil Rights Movement, the Black Conscious
Movement or the Afrocentric Movement. Segregation and conscious racial
discrimination were not only the explicit law of the land in many places but
also the standard American business, educational, political, and social
practice. To discriminate based on race in stores, restaurants, hotels,
motels, and other places of entertainment was generally accepted as a fact
of life. Negroes seldom occupied positions in American businesses and
corporations above the most menial levels. For the most part, lower level
management positions were even unobtainable. What in the 1990s we
refer to as the "glass ceiling" was a firmly implanted, outright concrete
barrier forty years ago. In 1954, only a handful of Negroes attended
prestigious colleges and universities in this country and almost none of
them taught there. A colored man had not been elected mayor of a major
U.S. city in the twentieth century, and there were only four Negroes
serving in Congress, none having been elected from the South since 1900.
In 1954, many places in the country had separate facilities for whites and
coloreds, including: water fountains, waiting rooms, transportation facilities,
restrooms, schools, hospitals, and cemeteries. The Court's opinion in
Brown I preceded the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the single most sweeping
piece of civil rights legislation in the country's history, by ten years. It
also preceded, by eleven years, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which
effectively secured the right to vote for most Negroes living in the South.
This is where the majority of Negroes lived at the time and most had been
disenfranchised since the 1890s.
In 1954, the collective history of race relations in North America,
which had spanned almost 335 years, was primarily one of slavery and,
after the Reconstruction period following the Civil War, one of legally
enforced and sanctioned segregation. It was a history of almost
uninterrupted use of race to classify people of African descent for purposes
of subjugation.
According to the Court's opinion in Brown I, the harm of de jure
segregation was not limited to violations of governmental neutrality but
included also the tangible effects upon blacks. In one of the most quoted
phrases from Brown I,8 the Court stated that "[t]o separate [African-
American youth] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
188. Professor Derrick Bell has noted that proponents of integration quoted this
phrase over and over to justify their belief that integration provides the proper route to
equality. Derrick Bell, The Dialectics of School Desegregation, 32 ALA. L. REv. 281,
285 (1981).
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because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone.'i89 The Court went on to quote approvingly from the
district court in Kansas:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools
has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The
impact is greater when it has the sanction of law; for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a
tendency to retard the educational and mental development
of negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school
system. "9
Before continuing, we must first understand the breadth of the Court's
conclusions about the harm of segregation. Since the Court indicated that
the harms suffered were never likely to be reversed, the harms presumably
also affected those blacks who had attended segregated schools prior to
1954. As a result, it was not just black school children who stood to be
psychologically damaged by segregation, but also black adults, who as
products of such schooling were already so damaged. In an opinion which
today may come close to group slander, the Supreme Court explicitly states
that Negroes have had their educational and mental development stunted by
segregation. Despite the presence of sociological testimony concerning the
harm suffered by whites as a result of segregation, the Supreme Court
189. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). The social science
evidence cited by the Court in footnote 11 was specifically intended to prove that
segregation produced a psychological harm to African-Americans. Doubt, however, has
always been expressed as to whether the social science evidence cited in Brown I actually
influenced the Justices. See Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157-
58 & n.16 (1955); RALPH Ross & ERNST VAN DEN HAAG, THE FABRIC OF SOCIETY 165-66
(1957). In addition, the research by psychologists purporting to show that African-
Americans in public schools had lower self-esteem has been the subject of criticism
recently by WILLIAM CROSS, SHADES OF BLACK (1990). He argues that in the 1950s
psychologists assumed that racial group preference was closely correlated with self-
esteem. Id. at 51-52. As psychologists developed methods of testing self-esteem directly,
however, they discovered that African-American self-esteem tests out as high or higher
than that of whites.
190. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797,
798 (D. Kan. 1951)).
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based its opinion on the fact that only African-Americans were damaged by
segregation. 1' The Court implies, therefore, that the psychological and
mental development of whites was unaffected by dejure segregation.
Let me first note that there is an important, critical distinction between
basing segregation upon a false premise that African-Americans are not the
equals of whites and believing that segregation actually distorted the
cognitive, psychological, and emotional development of blacks. According
to the former, the structure of education was based upon the false premise.
According to the latter, because of segregation, blacks were actually made
inferior to whites. Under the former, racism was irrational because the
premise it was based upon was false. According to the latter, racism has a
rational basis, but the inferiority of blacks is presumed, at least
theoretically, to be curable. According to the former, since both blacks
and whites were being indoctrinated with the false premise of black
inferiority, both were victimized by de jure segregation though in different
ways. According to the latter, the harm of de jure segregation effected
only blacks. According to the former, desegregation as a remedy for
segregation would have benefited both blacks and whites. According to the
latter version, and the Supreme Court, inter-racial exposure of Caucasians
to African-Americans was not beneficial to white students. In effect, the
Supreme Court accepts the idea that blacks are inferior to whites but simply
changes how that inferiority should be treated. Desegregation was needed
because of-not in spite of-the fact that the Supreme Court thought whites
to be superior to blacks.
191. Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social
Science Statement, reprinted in 37 MINN. L. REV. 427, 430-31 (1953).
With reference to the impact of segregation and its concomitants on
children of the majority group, the report indicates that the effects are
somewhat more obscure. Those children who learn the prejudices of
our society are also being taught to gain personal status in an
unrealistic and non-adaptive way. When comparing themselves to
members of the minority group, they are not required to evaluate
themselves in terms of the more basic standards of actual personal
ability and achievement. The culture permits and, at times,
encourages them to direct their feelings of hostility and aggression
against whole groups of people the members of which are perceived as
weaker than themselves. They often develop patterns of guilt feelings,
rationalizations and other mechanisms which they must use in an
attempt to protect themselves from recognizing essential injustice of
their unrealistic fears and hatreds of the minority groups.
Id. at 431.
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I do not wish to be perceived as voicing the proposition that the
Supreme Court was wrong in striking down dejure segregation in 1954. It
seems to me that only a fool would take such an outlandish position. As an
African-American law professor, it is obvious that had the Court not struck
down de jure segregation in Brown I, I would not be in the position to
write this article. I extol the valor that the Court exhibited in breathing life
into the moral imperative of equality enshrined in America's most
important legal documents. As a decision to strike down de jure
segregation, Brown I should be looked upon and revered as a fundamental
effort by the Supreme Court that sparked a historic effort by American
society to attempt to break with its racially oppressive past. Without
question, the opinion helped to open doors for African-Americans that
prior to it were permanently barred. Certainly there were extra-legal
implications for an opinion like Brown I, which made it important for the
Court to reach unanimity. Additionally, considerations about the
inflammatory nature of the subject matter may have caused the Court quite
correctly to write the opinion the way that it did. I am, therefore, willing
to concede that the Court delivered the best opinion possible for the
American society as it existed in 1954.
Now, however, it is forty years after the Court's opinion in Brown I.
The America of today is not the one that existed then. Many of the people
who were called Negroes as a term of respect in 1954 would be offended
to be called a Negro today. To call such a person "Black" is not an insult,
but a sign of respect, and in most circles, the term used is "African-
American." This term makes an explicit link between, and shows respect
for, both past and present homelands. This America is not before the Civil
Rights Movement and the Black Conscious Movement, but twenty-five
years after it. Americans no longer live with white-only and colored-only
signs etched above water fountains, waiting rooms, transportation facilities,
restrooms, schools, hospitals, and cemeteries. The Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 have been the law for over thirty
years. Even in contexts where it is not against the law to consciously use
race to discriminate, the general American ethos makes it clear that it is at
least considered wrong or in bad taste to discriminate against blacks solely
on the basis of race. In brief, Americans live today in a society that has
been altered by Brown I. American society is considerably different forty
years later because of that opinion, and many of those changes have been
monumental.
In this article, I am addressing problems which the judges and the
NAACP may not have anticipated in 1954. Even if they were anticipated,
they were powerless to do anything about them. What I am doing,
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therefore, is looking at how a 1954 opinion is functioning in the context of
a 1995 society. A society that has been shaped and influenced by that very
opinion.
Twenty-three years after Brown I, the Court once again used the
traditional framework in approving the Milliken II remedies. In Milliken v.
Bradley" (Milliken I) the Court affirmed a district court order approving
remedial educational programs as part of the remedy for the de jure
segregation of the Detroit Public School System. 93 The order also required
the state of Michigan to pay half the costs of the programs. The
educational programs proposed by the Detroit School Board and approved
by the district court fell into four categories. The first was remedial
reading programs. The second was in-service training for teachers and
administrators. The purpose of the in-service training program was "to
train professional and instructional personnel to cope with the
desegregation process" in order "to ensure that all students in a
desegregated system would be treated equally by teachers and
administrators. '" 94  The third educational program related to revising
testing procedures. The testing program was adopted because the district
court found that black children were "especially affected by biased testing
procedures.""95 The fourth educational program was counseling and career
guidance. Counselors were included in the plan to address the
psychological pressures that undergoing desegregation would place on
Detroit's students. 96
All of the educational components, except the reading program, could
have been justified within the individualist framework's notion of
eliminating the bias in the school system that resulted from the violation of
governmental neutrality. In justifying its decision, however, the Court
stated that the African-American "[c]hildren who have been thus
educationally and culturally set apart from the larger community will
inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes reflecting their
192. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
193. Id. at 287. The district court determined that the State of Michigan was just as
responsible for segregation of Detroit's public schools as the school system.
Consequently, the district court assigned responsibility for half of the cost of the
educational components of the desegregation plan to the Detroit Public School System and
the other half to the State of Michigan. Id. at 277. This case reached the Court, because
the State of Michigan objected to being made partially responsible for funding this part of
the remedy. Id.
194. Id. at 275.
195. Id. at 276.
196. Id.
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cultural isolation . . . . Pupil assignment alone does not automatically
remedy the impact of previous, unlawful educational isolation; the
consequences linger .... '"' The implication of the Court's statements is
that the racial isolation forced upon these children somehow distorted and
retarded their development. The root condition caused by their racial
isolation had to be treated directly. While the Court noted that the
educational problems of African-American children are not peculiar to their
race, it clearly suggested that their problems were the result of racial
isolation. ,'According to the Court, the Milliken II remedies are intended to rectify
the problems faced by African-American school children. Segregation
isolated Caucasians from blacks also, but the presumption is that this did
not harm whites. Once again, the traditional framework was being used to
distinguish African-Americans from Caucasians in order to justify public
educational assistance for black students. Like the ordering of mandatory
racial balancing, the basis for this opinion is also the assumption that there
are knowing individuals, Caucasians, and people who are members of a
substandard group, African-Americans.
C. The Structure of and Arguments for Public Educational Programs
That Assist African-American Males
The traditional framework does not provide for considering the group
interests of black males separately from black females. To use the
traditional framework as the means for structuring public educational
programs that will assist African-American males requires that those
programs also include provisions for African-American females. This
point is illustrated best by the only court case that has addressed an equal
protection challenge with respect to an attempt to set up African-American
male schools.
In Garrett v. Board of Education," a federal district court addressed
the legality of African-American male academies which the City of
Detroit's Board of Education wanted to establish. The board had approved
the establishment of three male academies in order to respond to the plight
of African-American males. These academies were to open in the fall of
1991 and were to serve approximately 250 boys from preschool through
197. Id. at 287.
198. Id.
199. 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
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the fifth grade. The board intended to expand the program and phase in
programs for grades six through eight over the next few years.2"
The plaintiffs alleged that the attempt by the board to open these male
academies violated, among other provisions, the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining
order to prevent the opening of the male academies and a preliminary
injunction enjoining the defendant from excluding girls from the
academies. The plaintiffs were represented in the litigation by the ACLU
of Michigan and the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund. It can be
presumed that these organizations had a lot to do with structuring the
litigation in this case. The plaintiffs, presumably, did not advance the
potential issue of race discrimination because that would have defeated the
ability to get females into the academies. The district court handled this
issue as presented and dealt only with the issue of gender discrimination.
As a consequence, the court applied the presumably less demanding middle
level scrutiny test rather than applying the strict scrutiny test applicable for
race discrimination. According to the district court, exclusion of females
from publicly-funded schools violates the Equal Protection Clause, unless
the defendant can show that the sex-based classification serves important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."'
The plaintiffs made two sets of arguments regarding the
unconstitutionality of the male academies. First, they argued that the
special curriculum proposed for the academies suggested that there was a
dichotomy between the roles and responsibilities of boys and girls. Thus,
the Detroit public schools were arguing that the socialization of girls should
differ from that of boys. This argument in effect asserts that government's
establishment of male academics violates the constraint of neutrality
embedded within the individualist framework. In order to justify the
establishment of male-only academics, government has to treat people not
as individuals, but rather as either males or females.
Second, the plaintiffs argued that the black female students were just as
bad off as the boys. This argument is based upon the traditional
framework which sees all blacks-male and female-as members of a
200. Once these were phased in there would be places for a total of 600 boys who
could receive gender segregated education. Richard Cummings, All-Male Black Schools:
Equal Protection, the New Separatism and Brown v. Board of Education, 20 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 725, 743 (1993).
201. Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
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substandard group. Hence, exclusion of the girls from the academies was
not justified. The district court, in summing up the second argument,
stated:
[Pilaintiffs conclude that the male academies improperly
use gender as a 'proxy for other, more germane bases of
classification,' . . . in this instance, for 'at risk' students.
Specifically, the gender specific data presented in defense
of the Academies ignores the fact that all children in the
Detroit public schools face significant obstacles to success.
In fact, in its resolution establishing the Academies, the
Board acknowledged the "equally urgent and unique crisis
facing . . . female students." Urban girls drop out of
school, suffer loss of self esteem and become involved in
criminal activity. Ignoring the plight of urban females
institutionalizes inequality and perpetuates the myth that
females are doing well in the current system. Accordingly,
plaintiffs contend there is no adequate justification for the
Academies' exclusive focus on boys."
The district court agreed with the plaintiff's second argument. The
board had argued that the academies were needed to address the crisis
facing African-American males as manifested by their high homicide,
unemployment, and drop-out rates. The district court agreed that the
statistics regarding the conditions of African-Americans males underscored
a compelling need and, thereby, satisfied the first prong of the middle level
scrutiny test.2 3 Where the district court faulted the board was on its
inability to meet the second prong of the test. The degree of importance
does not eliminate the burden of showing that the exclusion of girls was
substantially related to the important governmental objective. The district
court went on to hold that the defendant failed to demonstrate how the
exclusion of females from the academies was necessary to combat
unemployment, dropout, and homicide rates among urban males.2" The
district court agreed also with the arguments of the plaintiffs that the school
system was failing females as well.2°
202. Id. at 1007 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
203. Id. at 1007-08.
204. Id. at 1008.
205. Id.
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IV. CONTRASTING THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN THE TWO FRAMEWORKS
Given the historic analyses that have been applied to the issue of race
or gender and education, it is unlikely that public educational programs
aimed at improving the plight of black males can be limited only to black
males. Neither the individualist nor the traditional frameworks allow for
addressing only the problems of black males. Programs to assist black
males must be part of a larger program that either under the individualist
framework, assists all students or under the traditional framework, assists
both male and female black students. Since each framework rests upon
different conceptions of the social world and where race and gender fit into
it, the acceptable legal arguments under either framework must be
structured in different ways.
The workings of these two frameworks and their implications for legal
analysis can be illustrated by contrasting the VMI and The Citadel cases
with Garrett. Since all of these cases addressed the same issue of gender-
segregated education, where the option to apply for admission was
provided only to males, they could have been analyzed in the same
manner. The subtext of Garrett, however, was gender-segregated
education for African-American males. The Fourth Circuit in the VMI
case, the district court in the Citadel case, and the district court in Garrett
applied the same middle level scrutiny test appropriate for equal protection
challenges to gender classifications. Each of the three courts concluded
that providing the benefit of gender-segregated education to only males
violated the Equal Protection Clause, because the benefit was not
substantially related to an important governmental interest. Where the
constitutional analysis differed among these cases was on what constituted
the substantial governmental interest. The legal analysis in United States v.
Virginia and Shannon v. Faulkner was conducted within the individualist
framework. As a result, the substantial governmental interest was diversity
in education. As a consequence, the structure of the legal arguments led
proponents of VMI and The Citadel to focus exclusively on the benefits of
gender-segregated education as a pedagogical alternative to coeducational
learning.
In contrast, the district court in Detroit analyzed this issue within the
traditional framework. It concluded that the substantial governmental
interest justifying the establishment of the male academies in Detroit was
the crisis condition of African-American males. The legal justifications
given for these schools was that black males are in a crisis situation because
of their homicide rates (tendencies toward violence), their unemployment
rates (tendencies toward laziness), and their drop out rates (lack of
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intelligence). Hence, the legal structure of this issue required the
proponents of the male academies to focus on the deplorable condition of
African-American males both inside and outside educational institutions.
In fact, the worse the condition of African-American males could be made
to appear, the better the chances of establishing the substantial interest that
would satisfy the first prong of the intermediate test.
These two legal frameworks have different implications for th& black
male students who might attend programs that are justified within the
separate frameworks. Since the individualist framework abhors confining
people based upon characteristics they did not choose, the racial and
gender issues are subordinate to the educational justifications. The
arguments for gender-segregated education within the individualist
framework are directed towards asserting that, for pedagogical reasons, all
students could receive a better education. The implication is that students
trained in gender-segregated programs are actually better trained than those
persons from coeducational institutions. In contrast, the justification for
gender-segregated public educational programs within the traditional
framework is remedial. The purpose of such education is to provide
special assistance to a group of people who are failing not only in the
school system but in society at large. The implication for these students is
not the positive one that exists under the individualist framework. Under
the traditional framework, the implication is that the students are in need of
special remedial assistance.
Finally, the implications of structuring programs that assist black males
within these two frameworks have different messages for black females as
well. Within the individualist framework, no special attention is brought to
their race or gender. Within the traditional framework, attention is brought
to them but in a negative manner. Within this framework, the racial
condition of blacks as a substandard group is what justifies the remedial
program. As a result, it is the crisis condition of black women that justifies
the extension of gender education to them.
CONCLUSION
When we engage in legal discourse we are engaged in a process of
conceptualizing and articulating given phenomena in a way that respects
the various patterns of understandings or cognitive frameworks used by the
legal system. These patterns of understanding, or cognitive frameworks,
are the result of historically developed ways of understanding various legal
phenomena. They are also self-perpetuating and self-validating because
they dictate the kinds of arguments that are persuasive for resolving legal
disputes. Historically, cognitive frameworks are brought to a current legal
19941
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
problem under the guise of stare decisis. Therefore, the press of prior
legal history is always exerting a molding influence on the structure of any
current legal dispute.
The point of this article is to demonstrate the "crisis" of the current
regime of legal conceptualization for developing public educational
programs to respond to the "crisis" facing African-American males.
Proponents of such programs have two alternative frameworks in which to
structure and legally argue for their legitimacy. Each of these cognitive
frameworks, the individualist framework and the traditional framework, is
the product of prior constitutional developments. Since they have
incommensurable views of the social world and African-Americans' place
within it, they provide alternative ways of structuring and arguing for
programs that can benefit African-American males.
The basic organizing premise of the individualist framework is a
conception of society as a collection of knowing individuals. The
individualist framework, however, will not allow the establishment of
programs that just benefit African-American males. Such programs must
comply with the requirement of governmental neutrality embedded in this
framework. Within this framework, proponents are forced to structure the
programs and arguments in such a way as to deny that they are actually
programs for African-American males. These governmental programs
must be racially and gender neutral programs. In order to do this, it will
necessarily mean that a considerable amount of flexibility will be lost.
Racially neutral methods to determine both participants and instructors will
no doubt be required. In addition, the rationale for such programs should
be based upon sound educational reasons as opposed to political
considerations, such as the "crisis" of the condition of African-American
males. In this way, the argument can be made consistent with the
requirements of governmental neutrality in the individualist framework that
the school district is providing the option of gender segregated education
for all students. Even if this is done, it is still an uphill argument to
convince a court that the liberal framework does apply.
The traditional framework organizes the social world around a
different conception. It views the social world as composed of knowing
individuals who are generally Caucasian of European descent and members
of various substandard groups-which would include blacks. The
application of this framework is most likely in school systems where the
student body is predominately minority. The traditional framework will
not allow the establishment of programs that just benefit African-American
males and not African-American females, because both black males and
females are seen as in need of remedial assistance.
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It is certainly easier to be up-front about racial aspects of gender
segregated education in the traditional framework than it is in the
individualist framework. The cost of the traditional framework exacted
upon African-Americans is, however, extremely high. It converts
proponents of programs for African-American males (and now females as
well) into their largest defamers."° In order to justify programs within this
framework, proponents are locked into a structure of legal argumentation
that requires that they rationalize the negative stereotypes about African-
American males (and females). The better their arguments and statistics
demonstrate the deplorable nature of African-American males (and
females), the better their chances of at least establishing the compeling or
substantial state interest that will justify such programs. Hence, within this
framework, proponents are locked into a legal structure where they are
called upon to be advocates for the inadequacies of those they wish to
help. 20
7
There is certainly no guarantee that courts will approve programs that
rely on the traditional framework. Being forced into the traditional
framework could put proponents of programs for African-American males
(and females) into the worst of all possible positions. They could both be
working to rationalize negative stereotypes about African-American males
(and females) and still not be successful in having the programs upheld
against an equal protection challenge.
In short, the crisis conditiori of legal argumentation for those who
answer the secondary normative question is clear. Either they must hide
their intentions to engage in race and gender motivated programs, or they
must become the biggest critics of the very group they most want to help.
Whichever route they choose, it is far from certain that they will be
successful.
206. Professor Derrick Bell makes this point explicit in his discussion about the usual
price of racial remedies. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 647-48
(3rd ed. 1992).
207. Certainly many have understood affirmative action programs in college and
university admissions as also products of the pejorative framework. Take for example the
argument that Archibald Cox made during oral argument in Bakke. "For generations,
racial discrimination in the U.S. isolated certain minorities [and] condemned them to
inferior education. . . . There is no racially blind method of selection which will enroll
today more than a trickle of minority students in the nation's colleges and professions." J.
HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 261(1979).
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